Editor's Note

"Thresholds Revisited I & II: From Theory to Practice" are presented to you by the *Thresholds in Education* Board of Directors. The articles in these volumes are from the *Thresholds'* archives. We have selected them for their relevance to problems in the many geographies of our readership, today. They model the kind of responsible discussion that is so critical for educational progress in changing times.

In this volume we offer a powerful collection of articles to provoke consideration of the theoretical, historical and philosophical foundations of democratic process in educational systems. O'Neill reviews the work of three 19th century theorists who each present a unique vision of cultural pluralism. These visions, O'Neill claims, were part of early attempts to reconceptualize and revitalize democracy. She presents a critical analysis of these visions in order to examine the justifications for multicultural education as it is practiced today. At the other end of the historical spectrum, Hunter and Garrison offer an optimistic discussion of the power of educational technology to potentially create more effective and democratic schools. Comparing the "process view" of science with the "end-product" view, these authors discuss the attributes of competing philosophical frameworks as they manifest in practice and in the attitude and application of technology to classroom settings.

Radebaugh's prolegomenon presents complementary and contrasting meanings of democracy. From these, he selects "the social ideal of moral democracy" from which to consider values that could help answer questions such as: How would one recognize a good democratic citizen? And: How would one recognize a good democratic education? Radebaugh concludes with suggestions for how a values criterion for democracy could benefit educators struggling with these issues in the curriculum.

Townsend examines the content of several educational history texts to argue that certain issues remain underrepresented in texts today because of selection practices. She calls into question the unexamined assumptions upon which the selection criteria are based and suggests ethical implications that can be drawn from her analysis. Townsend's discussion complements the theme of this collection as it causes us to consider a more democratic process for selecting the voices and views represented in the publication research efforts. Given that these publications help determine what is considered knowledge and worthy of consideration in other contexts, the power and therefore potential discrimination of these practices can be significant. Policy is also examined by Quigley. Focusing on social policy and literacy, Quigley discusses the history, frameworks and applications of national and international models. Connecting, of course, literacy with the ability of people to participate in democracy, this article proposes that future policy must develop from models that reflect open, participatory, democratic processes.

Originally published in 1989, Raywid's article illuminates the pendular swings between a "product" or "outcomes focus" of educational objectives and the "preoccupation with process." She claims it is during the process-oriented periods that institutional democracy tends to receive more attention. Within this framework, Raywid places issues such as the Excellence Movement, private management of public school systems, school choice, restructuring, and teacher

empowerment. She considers these issues in terms of the principles (democratizing effects) versus pragmatics (organizational effectiveness).

Three articles look at values and democracy in education. Buckminster Fuller reminds us of environmental and social issues interfacing with education. He asks us to think globally about the impact that a design science revolution would have on humanity and warns "the human passengers of Spaceship Earth" of the imminent peril should they ignore this imperative. In another way, values are examined as they reveal the "ideological distortions that ratify undemocratic conditions." Pongo discusses the development of African-American values and their impact on Arican-American attitudes toward education. From this analysis, he recommends the directions that should be taken to create more harmonious community. It is at this point that his vision merges with that of Fuller. Pongo realizes the interface in contextualized multicultural education and awareness of "shared stakes in the ecological crisis" and care for the natural environment. Finally, Dr. Spock closes this discourse with a reflection on the values and attributes of our species which promote competition, controversy and conflict and those which promote compromise, cooperation and community—war and peace. Although some of the examples date the article originally published in *Thresholds* in 1975, the issues around which Spock builds a platform for educational reform remain current.

So, there you have it: A preamble to our multidimensional consideration of democratic process in education. As this selection of articles culled from issues published over the last twenty-five years illustrates, some problems in education keep re-emerging. With intensifying attention to state and federal standards, multiculturalism, and school violence, the "social ideal of moral democracy", as Dewey describes, again becomes an organizing theme for public and professional debate. What will be our response to this re-emergence? Will we dismiss the issue because we've "been there, done that?" Will we decide that this time around we have increased professional maturity and the desire to re-engage with the discussion at a more effective level? Will we decide that nothing is going to change; and, therefore, it is a waste of time and energy to get involved? What is our responsibility as educators to question the questions? What is our vision of what is wanted and needed this time around? How do we make that happen? At what price? For whom? For what reasons? For how long? This issue of *Thresholds* will provoke a reconsideration of these questions and others. With this and other offerings we hope to continue to be your link to innovative and critical approaches to resolving contemporary educational issues and problems.

Biographical & Historical Passages Into Freedom: The Pluralisms of Horace Meyer Kallen, Alain Locke, and Isaac Baer Berkson

by Linda O'Neill

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All philosophies...may merely be the lineaments of a personality, its temperament and dispositional attitudes projected into their systematic rationalizations.
— *Alain Locke*

Cultural pluralism as a social philosophy is characterized by the paramount value it attaches to cultural diversity. Identified with the work of Horace M. Kallen and Alain Locke, cultural pluralism has been offered as a philosophical justification for multicultural education as it is practiced in various forms today. As the twenty-first century approaches, it seems fitting to reflect on the commitments of three educators who dedicated themselves to addressing issues of pluralism and democracy not so dissimilar from those we face today. Horace Meyer Kallen (1882-1974), Alain Locke (1886-1954) and Isaac Baer Berkson (1891-1975) developed unique visions of pluralism as each attempted to reconcile competing versions of democracy for an industrializing nation in the first half of this century. While the individual insights of these cultural pluralists have often been appropriated, taken as a group they provide insights into the difficulties of redefining democratic individualism. This paper explores Kallen's vision as a point of departure for the developing philosophies of both Locke and Berkson who critiqued and enriched Kallen's conceptualizations.

Horace Meyer Kallen (1882-1974)

In recent scholarship, Kallen's work has often been cited and criticized. While Kallen's cultural pluralism has been claimed as the philosophical wellspring for some versions of multiculturalism, critics portray it as a misguided precursor to current confusion (Tesconi, 1990, 28-40). Horace Meyer Kallen espoused, refined and attempted to embody cultural pluralism as a living philosophy throughout his life. He claimed that he first used the term "cultural pluralism" around 1906 or 1907 when he was George Santayana's graduate assistant at Harvard. The term developed into a name for a set of arguments during Kallen's conversations at Oxford with the young Alain Locke (Guy, 1993, 57-58).

Cultural pluralism, then as now, signified a philosophy that challenged the basic premise of unity as the nation's paramount value (Ratner, 1953, v). The price of national unity was obvious in the educational and political rhetoric of the early twentieth century. The promise was membership in a democratic nation; the price was severance from ethnic group affiliation. During his presidency which carried the nation through the throes of World War I, Woodrow Wilson asserted:

> America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American (Parenti, 1970, 77).

In opposition to this sentiment, Kallen offered a passionate counterpoint. As World War I

escalated in Europe and Asia, Kallen published his first exposition of cultural pluralism in a two-part article in *The Nation* in 1915 entitled "Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot" (Kallen, 1915a, 190-194). In this article, Kallen retold the nation's story as the "biography of the land." He characterized the Declaration of Independence as a document that asserted the "natural rights" of the colonists over the "divine rights" of the British monarchy. At the center of this assertion was the claim that "all men are created equal." Kallen criticized Edward Alsworth Ross, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin (where Kallen was briefly Professor of Psychology and Philosophy), for turning this assertion on its head by "documenting ways in which immigrant groups were not created equal" and worse, ranking them in order of worth. From an historical argument, Kallen made his case for an America that did not hold one group above others. He proposed that American democracy promised "multiplicity in a unity," a nation of different and equal partners. To make his point, Kallen used the metaphor of an orchestra in which:

> [E]very type of instrument has its specific timbre and tonality, founded in its substance and form; as every type has its appropriate theme and melody, and the harmony and dissonances and discords of them all make the symphony of civilization, with this difference: a musical

symphony is written before it is played; in the symphony of civilization the playing is the writing so there is nothing so fixed and inevitable about its progressions as in music so that within the limits set by nature they may vary at will, and the range and variety of the harmonies may become wider and richer and more beautiful" (1915b, 217-220).

For Kallen, the individual was "the seat of value." But each individual was also a link in the "historic chain which is heredity."

In this article, Kallen was contrasting his vision of cultural pluralism with the melting pot ideology and the Americanization rhetoric of 1915. In 1924 he juxtaposed his vision against the rise of the KKK (which he labeled the Kultur Klux Klan) in *Culture and Democracy in the United States.* In his sixty-year struggle in support of his conception of American freedom, he found himself pitted against the ideologies of nationalism, the KKK, communism, and fascism. Kallen used his impassioned rhetoric to paint sweeping historical, biographical and genealogical sequences replete with paradox and leading back again and again to his orchestral vision.

Surprisingly, he did not analyze the unity in diversity issues with the logical or empirical tools he claimed to value so highly. Like much of the liberal analysis of the 1930s which had the "constructive precision of scattergun," Kallen's pluralism, according to some critics, "ultimately failed to offer any adequate structure capable of eliciting unity" (Akam, 1990, 124-130).

In delineating the relationship between the individual and democracy, Kallen envisioned freedom in democracy as "the individual's concern for his own integrity and on his consequent free movement between and among the diversity of group formations" (Kallen, 1956, 87). This individual freedom was not to be found outside the cultural or ethnic group:

> Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons, in order to cease being Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons would have to cease to be. The selfhood...is ancestrally determined, and the happiness which they pursue has its form implied in ancestral endowment. This is what, actually, democracy in operation assumes (Kallen, 1915b, 220).

For Kallen, the individual was "the seat of value." But each individual was also a link in the "historic chain which is heredity." To sever the link was to cut the person adrift. He characterized the individual as a unique point "at the intersection of geographical, political, economic,

and social elements of group life constituting environment" (Kallen, 1924, 58-59).

While Kallen advocated a tentative approach to life based on a pragmatic assessment of effects, he also promoted a quasi-religious devotion to the "American Idea." The American Idea as first expressed by abolitionist Theodore Parker, demanded "...a government of all the people, by all the people, for all the people...the idea of Freedom" (Kallen, 1949, xiii-xiv). In support of this American Idea, Kallen proposed that our cultural tradition be transmitted in the form of a "Gospel of America." This gospel would include the major documents legitimating and clarifying the nation's tenets from the Declaration of Independence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the Assembly of the United Nations (Hirsch, 1956, 87-88).

Teaching the implications of the American Idea was "the most important nearest task for those concerned about the country's future." Against the "welter of vocational interests and pedagogic fads [and] the insatiable greed of the industrial machine with its tendency to pit native against ethnic and class against class," Kallen proposed education for the "Great Vocation" of citizenship. This education would transmit the "living faith in the potential excellence of every man, and every natural group, according to kind..." (Kallen, 1924, 66). It was Horace Kallen's hope that his-

torical and biographical sequences, like those that anchored his own social philosophy, could become passageways leading away from habit and prejudice into growing freedom and "felt fellowship with all persons of all times." Perhaps it was in this spirit that Alain Locke and Isaac Baer Berkson began to explore some of the twists and turns in Kallen's multi-layered perspectives.

Alain Locke (1886-1954)

Horace Kallen did not analyze the tensions resulting from the combination of pluralism linked to primal ancestries and unification based on contractual consent, but Alain Locke did. Focusing on contradictions as he uncovered them, Locke identified the paradox of American democracy beneath the choices African-Americans and other cultural minorities were forced to make. Since democracy "required the uncritical acceptance of faith in constitutional values...valuing and advancing one's own culture led to the risk of being different and, thereby, anti-democratic" (Guy, 1993, 46-61, 194-195). Having gained insights from his work with the Atlanta and Harlem Adult Education Experiments, Locke shifted from a faith in voluntary pluralism to a conviction that equal rights must be acquired via group solidarity (Locke, 1936, 126-31). Locke's later works reflected his growing conviction that, within the United States, securing equal rights for cultural minority groups was the

key to a viable democracy. Locke proposed an alternative for those torn between assimilation and separation: the reconceptualization of American individualism. Shifting from individual rights to group rights, African Americans could achieve equal group power in social, political, and economic relationships, something they could not do as individuals (Guy, 1993, 194-196). Locke proposed cultural education as a vehicle for reviving the African-American group concept, an integral step in reconceptualizing democracy (Guy, 1993, 11, 214).

Locke incorporated the deeper sources of difference he attributed to value pluralism into his distinctive vision of cultural pluralism. He asserted that our "value reactions guided by emotional preferences and affinities are as potent in the determination of attitudes as pragmatic consequences are in the determination of actions" (1935, 318). He hoped that once we realized the primacy of valuing itself, and we acknowledged our values as imperatives or norms rather than as absolutes, our "sectarian fanaticisms" might lose "some of their force and glamour" (1935, 332). Locke proposed value relationships based on parity and reciprocity rather than on priority or monopoly. He contended that even if a struggle over means could be resolved, for example, by Marxist measures, we would still have conflicts about ends. He believed that "economic classes may be absorbed, but our

psychological tribes will not thereby be dissolved" (Locke, 1935, 331). As a result, the goal of education was "not to expect to change others but to change our attitudes toward them, and to seek rapprochement not by the eradication of such differences as there are but by schooling ourselves not to make so much of the differences" (Locke, 1974, 64).

Isaac Baer Berkson (1891-1975)

While Locke proposed a constructive program for the systematic examination of cultural pluralism, Isaac Baer Berkson questioned the very premise of Kallen's concept which seemed to give the "tribal pasts of race or ethnos" the power to circumscribe an individual's future. He feared that Kallen's enthusiastic promotion of ethnic solidarity would lead to enforced group affiliations irrespective of personal choices. As an alternative, Berkson proposed the Community Theory. Community Theory refused to establish a goal of national unity (Melting Pot, Americanization) or national diversity (Federation of Nationalities, Cultural Pluralism). Rather than assuming the centrality of race or ethnicity, Berkson proposed communities of culture which he defined as the shared inheritances of history, tradition, and religion (Berkson, 1920, 98). Communities of culture presupposed conformity to neither Anglo-Saxon nor ethnic traditions. Forces either maintained communities of

culture or allowed them to disintegrate. Berkson argued that this democratic, open-ended national vision would allow individuals to develop through the "interaction" of their own natures "with the richest environment," supporting diversity without mandating it (1920, 118).

Berkson also proposed that education be explicitly directed toward definite social ends as part of the citizenry's commitment to democracy. Berkson feared that democracy in the United States lacked communism's ideological precision and fascism's powerful certainties. He agreed with T.S. Eliot that "democracy undefined is weak, even dangerous" (Berkson, 1958, 154). He contended that:

> It is of the essence of democracy to encourage diversity of opinions. But diversity must be seen within a framework of unity. There must be a community of ethical aims, an accepted political system, and at least a minimum consensus on economic implications (1958, 155).

Given the all too obvious differences between the ideals of democracy and the realities of race and class inequalities (Berkson did not consider gender), our nation would continue to weaken unless it was revitalized. Renewed commitment to democracy dedicated to the worth of each person, the quality of human beings and the unity of the human race required the support of an educational system based

on a philosophy capable of providing guidance on central social issues. It also required the participation of workers' organizations, producers' and consumers' cooperatives, and professional associations mediating between the individual and the nation to foster opportunities for individuals to participate in government. Berkson envisioned " a vital type of adult education in which the study and promotion of the organization's interests would be the gateway for understanding the problems of the community as a whole" (Berkson, 1940, 115-116). His concept of organizational activity as "the project method" moved beyond both the organizational goals for productivity and employee satisfaction goals to the conception of organizations as vehicles for democratic participation.

Conclusion

Kallen, Locke, and Berkson offered educational visions for the twentieth century that integrated their distinctive commitments to cultural pluralism. Given the differences in focus and emphasis, the intersection of Kallen's ideas with those of Locke and Berkson established and sustained the discourse of democratic multiculturalism. This early attempt to reconceptualize and revitalize democracy left unresolved the nature and meaning of groups and their implications for personal identity. In light of Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel's recent observation that the "moral and

political institutional scheme of liberal democracy no longer fits the moral and political aspirations of its citizens" (Sandel, 1992, 4), these early attempts to reinvigorate democracy seem all too relevant today. They caution that we may have strained the limits of liberal democratic logic and that the people must now generate new vocabularies to express their political aspirations. Educators have a great stake in this effort and must themselves become speakers in a new conversation.

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Instructional Technology, Temper, Technique, and Teacher Empowerment

by J. Mark Hunter and James W. Garrison

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If, as Sir Francis Bacon said, knowledge is power, then those who hold a monopoly on the creation and dissemination of that knowledge are indeed the powerful. The knowledge spoken of by Bacon was scientific and technological knowledge. The idea was that the power of scientific knowledge would make it possible to build a better society. In our article we discuss the power of educational technology to make it possible to build a better and more democratic school. We will concentrate especially upon the social relations surrounding the creation and dissemination of knowledge and power it promises in public education. Our focus will emphasize educational technology and its relation to classroom teaching.

We are concerned that the creation and dissemination of scientific technical knowledge concerning education has remained primarily under the purview of the doctors; university PhD's and EdD's who create or discover knowledge and then distribute it to classroom teachers (or have it distributed for them). Teachers are usually held accountable to the "knowledge base", (including the knowledge offered by educational technology) and, indirectly, those who produce and distribute it. In this way the power that knowledge brings can become a tool of social control, and some might even say, oppression.

It is this holistic and interpretive approach to scientific inquiry and education that enables teacher (and students) to become democratic citizens, able to comprehend and creatively participate in the culture and the workplace.

Our hope is to point out ways in which classroom teachers should and perhaps could participate in the creation, discovery, design and refinement of instructional technology. We will suggest a way of describing the kind of relations that we think ought to exist within the technological temper of the classroom teachers' participation in the process and products of educational science and technology.

We think this describes the kind of democratic, social, and dialogical relationship necessary in the effective design, development, and application of instructional technology in the classroom. In this article we will address the issue of teacher enablement, particularly in the context of the creation borrowed from Bertrand Russell: they are *scientific temper* and *scientific technique*. The scientific temper is the ability to inquire to learn and to create knowledge. The scientific technique is the end application of knowledge in specific disciplines. From an explication of the terms, we will attempt to extrapolate from the scientific temper to the technologi-

cal temper and from the scientific technique to the technological technique.

Scientific Temper & Scientific Technique

The scientific temper as Bertrand Russell described it is "cautious, tentative, and piecemeal; it does not imagine that it knows the whole truth, or, even at its best, that knowledge is wholly true. It knows that every doctrine needs emendation sooner or later, and that the necessary emendation requires freedom of investigation and freedom of discussion." This process view of scientific activity stands in stark contrast to the end-product view of scientific knowledge as found in the scientific technique: "The practical experts who employ scientific technique, and still more the government and large firms (and even schools) which employ the practical experts, acquire a quite different temper from that of men and women of science – a temper full of a sense of limitless power, of arrogant certainty, and of pleasure in manipulation of even human material" (Russell, 1958). What is laid upon the table for consideration are two views of knowledge. On the one hand is knowledge as *process*, formative without assertion of finality. On the other hand is knowledge calcified and, if it is not already, it is waiting to become inert, a mere product.

Scientific Temper

On the goal of education, Dewey said it should be to "realize that scientific method is not something purely technical, remote and apart, but it is the instrumentality of socially controlled development. As their studies move on from year to year, the subjects labeled scientific and those labeled social and historical are kept in vital unity, so that each side deepens the meaning of the other" (Dewey – I in afterward of Mayhew & Edwards, 1936).

Scientific management and hierarchical accountability tend to destroy or distort dialogue. Instead of ideas being communicated in a democratic community, they are issued as orders to be obeyed down the chain of command. The result is not critical dialogue and collaboration but dogmatic soliloquy and conformity.

It is this holistic and interpretive approach to scientific inquiry and education that enables teachers (and students) to become democratic citizens, able to comprehend and creatively participate in the culture and workplace. Without the kind of scientific temper that gives teachers and student citizens the understanding that formal education is only a beginning and not an ultimate end in itself, learning becomes stagnant and the knowledge learned is reduced to mere scientific technique.

Scientific Technique

For those who have the virtues of scientific inquiry and the scientific temper set firmly in mind, it will not be necessary to dwell for very long on the vices of the scientific technique. The major shortcoming of the scientific technique is that it separates means from ends, the process from the product. Dewey (1946) writes that on this view:

"Science" . . . [is still seen as] something that a group of persons called scientists do; something they do in laboratories, observatories, and places of special research . . . The prestige of science is due for the most part not to general adoption of its temper of mind but to its material application. The inherent idealism of the scientific temper is submerged, for the mass of human beings, in the use and enjoyment of the material power and material comforts that have resulted from its technical applications.

The intellectually liberating process of inquiry, research and development is something participated in by only a small group of persons called scientists, while the rest of humankind seems con-

tent to distribute or consume its material products.

One of the results of separating the production, distribution, and consumption of scientific knowledge is a system of distorted and disjointed social relations that enables some and deprives many. The reign of "practical experts" who use the products of inquiry merely to manage "human material" has been accompanied by the recrudescence of dogmatic authority in government, industry, and the schools. Scientific management and hierarchical accountability tend to destroy or distort dialogue. Instead of ideas being communicated in a democratic community, they are issued as orders to be obeyed down the chain of command. The result is not critical dialogue and collaboration but dogmatic soliloquy and conformity, and in Dewey's (1946) words, "Logic in its fulfillment recurs to the primitive sense of the word: *dialogue*. Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought." Elsewhere Dewey (1946) declares that "democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion." Such a life does not exist for many student teachers in our schools of education or in the schoolhouse. Teachers are as a rule talked down to, dialogue degenerates into soliloquy, and democracy disappears.

The noble traits of individual method and creative autonomy are twisted by scientific tech-

nique. Directness, the concentration of effort and energy, is replaced by "diverted energy...loss of power and confusion of ideas." Confidence in the possibilities of situations gives way to mere self-confidence and egotism. Open-mindedness, seen as hospitability extended to the ideas of others, is transformed into empty-mindedness, the illusions of detached technique, and unreflective devotion to the methodological products, but not to the process. Dewey (1916) conjectures that "the chief cause of devotion to rigidity of method is, ...that it seems to promise speedy, accurately measurable results. The zeal for 'answers' is the explanation of much of the zeal for rigid and mechanical methods." Furthermore, single-mindedness, the unity of creative self-expression and internal motivation, is replaced by "divided interest and evasion." Such double-mindedness results from "motivation through rewards extraneous to the activity." Pursuits are carried out merely for their products. No pleasure is taken in the process of inquiry or what Francis Bacon somewhere called "the chase of Pan." All integrity of purpose lacking. Finally, and most unfortunately, individuals lose, or worse still, never acquire, a sense of responsibility. Since those who merely distribute or consume products do not identify themselves with the process by which the final outcome is obtained, they are not as likely to feel responsible for the consequences of their acts. For the

nonparticipant concerned only with products, there is no integrity of purpose nor, as Dewey (1916) expresses it, is there any "acceptance of responsibility for the consequence of one's activity including thought." Perhaps, this is why there are so many dire reports on the status of our students.

We could say more about the tragedy and travesty of the scientific technique; but for our purposes, that is, for the discussion of the relationship between scientific knowledge, instructional technology and the educational practitioner, we have said enough. The reader may readily infer the rest.

Instructional Technology, Temper & Technique

Instructional Technique

The instructional technique in education may be found in what Arthur Wirth (1983) called vulgar efficiency: "in which [workers'] productivity is measured as a proportion of input to output. This represents an engineer's way of defining efficiency within closed circuit mechanical systems." Wirth (1983) goes on to say that social values are systematically excluded from this model of efficiency. While this is certainly not the only form of the scientific technique in education, it is a worthy example.

The clearest example of this mentality is embodied in the landmark *The Principles of Scientific Management*, by

Frederick W. Taylor. Taylor (1911) believed that there was "one best way of doing a job and this method could be determined only through the scientific study of that job by experts with proper implements. . ." He saw his theory as providing an "almost equal division of the work and the responsibility between the management and workmen." For Taylor (1911) this meant that "one type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely different type to execute the work." Managers were to analyze, plan and control. The worker's "equal division" was to do what he was told by management. A mechanic working under Taylor reported that Mr. Taylor told him he was "not supposed to think; there are other people paid for thinking around here."

As Raymond Callahan has shown in his *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (1962), "Taylorism" became the dominant mode of educational administration by the late 1930's and with some considerable modification has remained in that position ever since. The most important modification of Taylorism was the technocratic management by objectives (MBO) model associated most closely with Robert McNamara and the idea of the "biggest bang for the buck." This idea was brought over from the defense department to education by Alice Rivlin in the late 1960s to assess the effectiveness of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as well as other federal educational legis-

lation. The idea quickly caught on in state legislation and spread into the field of education incorporated into things like competency based education (CBE), competency based teacher education (CBTE), outcome assessment and other similar measures of productivity.

High support for the type of accountability came from appointees to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). These appointees were from the Department of Defense which, under Robert McNamara, attempted to run the War in Vietnam via an output production model or MBO.

One of the key appointees was Alice Rivlin who worked for the Assistant Secretary for Program Evaluation. Ernest House (1978) comments that:

> Rivlin's thinking was striking in its use of physical analogies. She perceived education techniques and children the same as raw materials in a manufacturing process. They could be put into various combinations to determine the most efficient single grouping which would consistently give the best output products in factories, test scores in education. The analysis methodologies were lifted straight from manufacturing. This was the essence of the systems analysis approach. Relate input to output and determine the most efficient combination. This would save on scarce resources. 'Biggest bang for

the buck' in manufacturing, in weapons systems, and in social services.

Recall Pitt's comment that, "governments, organizations, and hierarchies represent tools just as hammers and nails do" (Pitt, 1983). When Robert McNamara attempted to apply MBO to obtain the most bang for the buck by measuring people as output, a bizarre thing happened; people became products—products that were counted, as in the nightly body count, products that had such and such an SAT, products that could be maximized. In the search for an accounting, the test became the primary focus, not what was being tested, an event reinforced by the reform movement of the 1980's. David Tyack (1990) asserted, "Policy makers came to regard tests as the chief measure of accountability" (Tyack, 1990). Once again the tail was wagging the dog.

This top-down technocratic detachment is indicative of the most strident of situations that fall under the scientific technique. House (1978) finds fault in the Tayloristic and technocratic management arguments of Rivlin:

> The systems analysis approach to evaluation promises to substitute specific techniques derived from 'science' for the knowledge of craft in teaching. It is a false promise, for such simple techniques cannot substitute for full fledged professional knowledge, much of it tacit

rather that explicit, which has been acquired over many years. Such a technological vision of knowledge rests on a confusion of tacit knowledge with generalizations and rules of procedure. In teaching as in speaking, if one relied on the formalized, externalized rules of procedure, one would be mute.

Often, maybe most times, teachers (the practitioners) are held accountable to the technocratic predetermined implementation of technology, the technique rather than to any creative use of it. The problem is that teachers are rarely consulted in the process of the construction or even implementation phase. They are merely held accountable to the product for which they themselves, as well as the technology, are merely instruments. This situation resembles the worker on the assembly line who performs certain tasks without either thought or imagination and who has no real identification with the final product because they had no real artistic role in the process of its creation and, therefore, no commitment to the quality of the final product. In the case of technologically delivered teacher-proof curricula, teachers do little more than lip sync the song or follow the keys of the player piano. As House points out, questions of educational practice are converted into questions of efficiency by systems analysis.

The emphasis in instructional temper lies not with the hardware, but in the processes of education. Emendation or feedback is built into all instructional systems, thereby allowing the practitioner to alter the design in the context of practice. With this emendation loop, the teacher is brought into the process. This is often operationalized through teacher autonomy.

The application of instructional technology in the classroom has too often followed this top-down, expert-systems, hierarchical structure exclusively. It has come, far too frequently, to resemble what we call instructional technology as technique rather than temper. The result is that instead of empowering and enabling classroom teachers and their creativity, it has often been harnessed instead as a substitute for the teacher and the teacher's work. The relation between the cognitive scientist, technology of hardware systems, the instructional technologist, and the educational practitioner is often linear and one-way.

The hierarchical, top-down and linear structure that many followers of the conventional wisdom regarding the relation between science, technology and practice prefer also illustrates the descending order of presumed purity and power of thought and, perhaps, of the thinkers as well.

Instructional Temper
The technological temper is the converse of the technique. While the tools of instructional technique and temper are similar, it is the emphasis in planning that makes a difference. The emphasis in instructional temper lies not with the hardware, but in the processes of education. Emendation or feedback is built into all instructional systems, thereby allowing the practitioner to alter the design in the context of practice; for example, the real world classroom. While the methods may be systematic, they are never without emendation. With this emendation loop, the teacher is brought into the process. This is often *operationalized* through teacher autonomy. With this paradigm the teacher becomes more than simply a mechanic who is told not to think. She, or he, is now connected back to the beginning of the design. The character of the tools and the use to which they have been put may change as practitioners become engaged in the process of shaping them. That is, according to J. C. Pitt (1990), "it is people who are doing the putting for some use, for some purpose."

Instead of merely being the tuners of a player piano, the educational practitioners (teachers) can throw the instructional technology into fresh combinations that may not only be more useful to them and their students but to others in the loop as well. This illustrates the appropriate relations socially, intellectually and otherwise between the hardware specialist, scientist, and instructional technologist.

Dewey, Democracy, & Logical Thinking

The reform movement of the 1980's reinvigorated the hierarchy of power--this time for the sake of enhanced accountability. David Tyack (1990) writes that, "implicit in all this was a transfer of power to a set of experts (the testers) who...were not directly accountable to democratic decision making."

Knowledge is power. In education, instructional technology comprises an important part of pedagogical knowledge. This knowledge is largely the property of the experts, the doctors, who produce it; it is they who possess the virtues of the scientific temper and participate in the process of pursuing knowledge.

Instructional technology is commonly "prepackaged," and the product is then distributed to legislatures, educational administrators, school board members and others. In scientific management, knowledge, including instructional technology, is distributed from the top down. Those at the bottom (teachers)

are frequently held accountable to it by those closer to the top; and, rather obviously, the power of that knowledge tends to reside with the accountants and not the teachers. Rather than democratically enabling teachers, instructional technology packages can sometimes actually tyrannize them – or worse.

Educational practitioners, especially teachers, have a great deal of practitioner knowledge; but because only scientific and technological knowledge is considered legitimate knowledge, their practical knowledge is devalued to the point where it imparts little if any power to the practitioner who possesses it and none to the scientist and technologist who could benefit from it to design better systems.

In a chapter of *Democracy and Education* titled "The Democratic Conception in Education," Dewey (1916) observes: Plato defined a slave as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct. This condition obtains even

where there is no slavery in the legal sense. It is found wherever men are engaged in activity which is socially serviceable, but whose service they do not understand and have no personal interest in. Much is said about scientific management of work. It is a narrow view which restricts the science which secures efficiency of operation to movements of the muscles. The chief opportunity for science is the discovery of the relations of a man to his work including his relations to others who take part – which will enlist his intelligent interest in what he is doing (emphasis added).

Instructional technology instituted as mere technological technique turns teachers into slaves to the degree that they do not understand it and/or are not encouraged to understand it and have no personal interest in it. This is a strong indictment; Dewey meant it to be – and so do we. Dewey (1916) did not deny that "efficiency in production often demands division of labor." What it does not demand is undemocratic social relations.

What is called for, we think, is a dialogue between the designers of instructional technology and the practitioners who must put it into practice. The pattern is that of the emendation characteristic of the technological temper.

Conclusion

Educational practitioners, especially teachers, have a great deal of practitioner knowledge; but because only scientific and technological knowledge is con-

sidered legitimate knowledge, their practical knowledge is devalued to the point where it imparts little if any power to the practitioner who possesses it and none to the scientist and technologist who could benefit from it to design better systems.

Practitioner participation in design development and emendation of instructional technology would have many happy consequences, four of which come readily to mind.

First, the participation of practitioners in research and development of instructional systems with more formally trained instructional technologies would be likely to yield results that are not only more valid and reliable, but more relevant as well.

Second, research and development involving practitioners, especially practitioner-initiated design, would help legitimate practitioners' knowledge.

Third, since knowledge, and the ability to obtain it, is power, the legitimization of practitioner knowledge would lead to the enablement of teachers.

Fourth, and finally, the epistemological enablement of teachers would produce a reorganization of the current hierarchical social structure advocated by a technocratic scientific management approach. The current monologue, in which scientific and technological experts, along with management, talks down to teachers, may, it is hoped, be replaced by a continuing dialogue of continuous hermeneutical (re)interpretation and mutually sustained inquiry.

There is ample room for expansion of our democratic circle beyond that of the present discussion. For example, there are the essential roles played by the students and parents. Nor, for that matter, do we want to reject the roles of business, industry,

and government. We would only want to place them within the dynamics of our ever evolving and ever expanding hermeneutic circle.

As it is now practiced, instructional design includes loops in the form of formative evaluation and summative evaluation. Also, included in the design team is a content expert, who may or may not be a practitioner. However, even when this is done, if the design is calcified, as we find in the technological technique, the practitioner is still cut off from any form of hermeneutical emendation (or change) to fit the particular classroom.

More democratic social relations in the development and implementation of instructional systems will yield better instructional design and practice.

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A Prolegomenon To The Development of a Democratic Ethic

by Byron F. Radebaugh

At the time of original publication, Byron F. Radebaugh was Professor, Foundations of Education Faculty, Department of Leadership and Educational Policy Studies, College of Education, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois.

John Dewey, after criticizing the adequacy of 'The Greatest Happiness Principle' of the utilitarians with its emphasis on "consequences" and the Kantian principle with its emphasis on the "motives of the actor" as the proper object of moral judgment, offered as a more adequate conception, the social ideal of "moral democracy," (Westbrook, 1991). He suggested, among other things, that the good democrat displayed

> ...wholeheartedness, persistence, and sincerity and ... the exercise of a few cardinal virtues: self-control of passions and appetites in the interest of the largest values at stake in any action ("temperance," a willingness to face often painful obstacles in the "pursuit of the common good"); ("courage"); and (conscientiousness," intelligent, deliberate judgment) (E, 363-379). This latter cardinal virtue was preeminent because "of all the habits which constitute the character of an individual, the habit of *judging* moral situations is the most important, for

this is the key to the *direction* and to the *remaking* of all other habits" (E, 375). Wisdom ("the nurse of all virtues") was knowledge as "intimate and well-founded conviction...directly connected with the affairs of common associated life"—thoughtfulness infused with sympathetic affections and producing insight into the common good (E, 364; 375-376). Whatever their various virtues, all virtuous men and women were temperate, courageous, just, and, above all, wise, for "genuine conscientiousness is guarantee of all virtue" (E, 376) (Westbrook, 1991).

In this article I shall, first, explore two additional meanings of the concept "democracy" as background for elaborating on the meaning of what Dewey calls "the social ideal of moral democracy" when viewed as a cluster of basic values. Second, I shall identify some possible procedures that might be used to identify basic democratic values. Third, I shall report the results of

some research that I have conducted of the writings of certain recognized scholars of democracy, which may, in addition to the values described by Dewey earlier, provide a prolegomenon for the development of a democratic ethic. Fourth, I shall briefly report the results of some additional research which has resulted in further insights into what a democratic ethic might entail. And finally, I shall offer some thoughts regarding how educators might use a democratic ethic in improving the quality of education in a changing democratic society.

Three Meanings of Democracy

The term "democracy" has several meanings. I wish to call attention to three of them. When many people use the word or term "democracy," what they are referring to is a form of government. This form of government is characterized by such things as the supreme power retained by the people and exercised either directly or indirectly through a system of representation and delegated authority that is re-

newed periodically, a Constitution, elections, different branches of government, and laws. This is the political meaning of democracy and is probably the one most widely used. All of us are familiar with this meaning so it need not be developed further here.

If we choose to consider democracy as a way of living characterized by certain basic values, the question that almost immediately comes to mind is, "What are these basic values?"

A second group of people use the term "democracy" to refer not to a form of government, but consider it to be a method of settling differences. This method involves a group of democratic citizens sensing they have a common problem. A meeting is called to discuss the problem and devise a course of action to solve it. A chairperson leads the discussion, follows certain protocols, and a decision is reached and action taken. The New England Town Meeting would be an example of democracy in this sense. It is the methodological meaning of democracy and all of us are familiar with it.

There is a third group of people who, when they use the term "democracy" are not referring to a form of government or a

method of settling differences, but to an entire way of living. This way of living is characterized by certain basic values. This is what I shall call "the philosophic meaning of democracy" or what Dewey called "the social ideal of moral democracy." It is this third meaning of democracy that I wish to explore, in somewhat more detail, with you here today.

Some Research Procedures for Identifying Basic Democratic Values

If we choose to consider democracy as a way of living characterized by certain basic values, the question that almost immediately comes to mind is, "What are these basic values?" Or perhaps a prior question would be, "How can we proceed to identify what the really basic, fundamental, important values of democracy, in fact, are?" What research procedures are available to us and might be fruitful in helping to answer this question? Some of the possibilities I have considered are as follow: We might
1. examine writings of recognized scholars of democracy and find out what they *say* are the basic values;
2. examine the documents prized by democratic citizens and identify the basic values contained in them;
3. examine the institutions created by democratic citizens and the values imbedded in them;
4. make use of opinion polls;

5. study some non-democratic societies and attempt to identify the values found in them and then compare these non-democratic values with what we consider to be democratic values.
There are other possibilities that might be considered but perhaps this is sufficient for now.

The Criterion Values
In the mid-1960s, I had occasion to become involved in conducting some research (content analysis) of selected portions of the writings of several recognized scholars in an attempt to identify what *they* considered to be basic democratic values. The result was what I have labeled "The Criterion Values" or what one might consider a beginning formulation of a democratic ethic.

From selected portions of the writings of the following recognized scholars of American education and democracy, the writer has formulated a composite listing of values which he will offer as among the basic elements of a "democratic ethic." The authorities are:
- John L. Childs, *Education and Morals*, 1950.
- George S. Counts, *Education and the American Civilization*, 1952.
- John Dewey, "Democracy and the Educational Administration," 1937.
- Charles Frankel, *The Democratic Prospect*, 1962.
- George Geiger, *Philosophy and the Social Order*, 1947.

- Sidney Hook, "Why Democracy is Better" in the March, 1948 issue *Commentary*, Volume 5, Number 5, pp. 195-204.
- Gordon C. Lee, "Abiding Principles of American Democracy," in Carl H. Gross, Stanley P. Wronski, and John W. Hanson, *School and Society*, 1962, pp. 134-143.
- Harold C. Hand, *Principles of Public Secondary Education*, 1958.

When an individual's behavior provides evidence that he/she is (insert the Criterion Value)...then he/she is acting democratically.

The Criterion Values

1. Using knowledge and reflective human thought to promote the welfare of all men and to build a better world.
2. Encouraging the unrestricted play of human intelligence on all problems.
3. Encouraging free discussion, free and full access to information, free expression of opinion, emphasizing accuracy and integrity, and affirming the guarantees found in the Constitution including freedom of thought, belief, speech, and press.
4. Testing policies in terms of what each promises to do to promote human welfare.
5. Assessing our concepts of truth and value in terms of relevant consequences describable within the realm of public human experience.
6. Regarding principles as rules for action.
7. Affirming tentativity, while being tough-minded about evidence and skeptical of all large claims.
8. Showing that we consider all human beings to be of supreme and equal moral worth, that we hold concern for individual welfare preeminent, that the people are the masters rather than the instruments of the state, and that the individual is superior to any agency created in his behalf.
9. Placing the final seat of authority in the hands of the people; acting on the assumption that the people have the capacity to govern themselves wisely and that they are the best judge of their own troubles.
10. Making the "good" life, however defined, equally available to all; and encouraging government to promote the welfare of all the people.
11. Encouraging those affected by a decision to have a voice in making that decision and assuming responsibility for the consequences of that decision; requiring that laws be made by representatives of our own choosing; insisting on equality in and before the law; and encouraging self-imposed law and order.
12. Providing each individual with quality instruction in the knowledge and experience of the race; equalizing the fortunes of birth; helping each child become a human person; and helping society maintain and further develop itself through quality education.
13. Permitting the seeking of employment in any lawful occupation of one's own choosing; engaging in any lawful enterprise; providing reasonable opportunities for social mobility; and encouraging and providing opportunities for all members to engage in some form of socially productive activity consistent with their interests and relevant to their abilities.
14. Eliminating physical threats, remediable ignorance, economic injustice; encouraging the right of opposition, dissent, universal suffrage, and recurring elections.
15. Making intelligent use of experts as creators, interpreters, implementers, critics, and proponents of new and better policy.
16. Encouraging as a positive, good new ideas, new customs, new art, new literature, new foods, new music, for the value they may have to the larger society, while at the same time distinguishing between those differences which will enrich our lives and those which would destroy it.
17. Adhering to the principle that the majority should rule at any given moment—but the minority may seek to change the will of the majority through persuasion based on

reason; and except for the minimum violation to test a case in court, the minority shall abide by the will of the majority even as they seek to change it.

18. Encouraging the minority to criticize the social consensus of the majority by supplying corrective evidence.

19. Affirming the principle that the best long run decisions are made when the widest consensus of citizens is sought regarding the decisions.

20. Regarding man as a social as well as an individual human being; that he is a product of society and is sustained by it.

21. Encouraging the use of pooled, cooperative experience, mutual consultation and agreement, and the willingness to abide by mutually agreed upon rules for settling differences.

22. Affirming the principle that each person has the right to worship in his own way as long as it is not injurious to the common good, and realizing that the ethic which permits religious freedom to all would be endangered if any one religious group was permitted to dominate our public institutions.

23. Determining what is "good" by the use of intelligence, argument, debate, and the ballot box.

24. Agreeing upon the permissible limits to diversity.

25. Encouraging intolerance of intolerance.

26. Advocating that positive steps be taken to implement the foregoing values.

I am convinced that one important way to try to become clear about what values one is prepared to affirm is to also try to become clear about what values one is prepared to reject.

Some comments about the foregoing cluster of basic democratic values might be helpful:

a. The reason I labeled these values "Criterion Values" was because I intended to use them as criteria for assessing the worthwhileness of eight collective bargaining agreements negotiated by teachers and boards of education.

b. The number in front of each value has no significance other than to identify the value.

c. The values go as a group— not individually.

d. There was a rationale used to support these values provided by the scholars. This rationale was not included here but can be found in the writings of the scholars.

e. The ideas as to what these values were belong to the scholars. My contribution was to collect them in one place and to attempt to state

them in a way they might be observed in behavior.

My research into democratic values has continued over the years, and I have had the opportunity to study several non-democratic societies in an attempt to identify what might be considered some basic *non-democratic* values.

Some Additional Research Findings

I am convinced that one important way to try to become clear about what values one is prepared to *affirm* is to also try to become clear about what values one is prepared to *reject*. During the fall semester of 1971, I had the opportunity to visit and study several non-democratic societies (East Germany, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Spain) in an attempt to locate some of the basic non-democratic values so they could be compared with the basic democratic values that resulted from the content analysis described earlier. During the Fall of 1982, I had the opportunity to revisit and restudy cultural conditions in both Greece and Spain in an attempt to determine what changes in values permitted the people in these two countries to remove their dictators and establish (or re-establish) a democratic way of living. Basically, this research has led me to reaffirm the adequacy of the earlier formulation of a democratic ethic, although I have revised the importance assigned to certain individual values, especially the one

about eliminating physical threats.

Conclusion

I shall conclude by offering some thoughts regarding how this cluster of basic values—a democratic ethic—might be used in helping to improve the quality of education, and why I referred to this presentation as a prolegomenon to the development of a democratic ethic.

"How would one recognize a good democratic citizen if one could find one somewhere?" "How would one recognize a good democratic education?"

First, these values could help answer questions like, "How would one recognize a good democratic citizen if one could find one somewhere?" "How would one recognize a good democratic education?" My answer to the first question would be to observe the behavior of the person/citizen and attempt to determine whether or not it is consistent with this basic cluster of values. My answer to the second question would be to attempt to determine whether or not there is evidence that the education (any deliberate attempt to influence conduct or behavior) under con-

sideration is also consistent with this basic cluster of values.

Second, they could be used to help educators assess the adequacy of their instructional objectives and goals.

Third, they could be used to help assess the adequacy of various educational proposals and/or arrangements. (I used them, for example, to assess the adequacy of eight collective bargaining agreements negotiated by teacher organizations and boards of education.)

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these basic values could be used as guidelines for helping those who take democracy seriously to organize and conduct their own lives in a democratic way.

John Dewey once said that the keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in the formation of the values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals (Dewey, 1937).

Michael W. Apple (1992) agrees with Dewey and calls attention to the importance of the creation of the conditions necessary for all people to participate in the creation and re-creation of meanings and values.

Apple, however, warns us that:

The very idea that there is one set of values that must guide

the "selective tradition" can be a great danger, especially in contexts of differential power. Take, as one example, a famous line that was printed on an equally famous public building. It read: "There is one road to freedom. Its milestones are obedience, diligence, honesty, order, cleanliness, temperance, truth, sacrifice, and love of country." Many people may perhaps agree with much of the sentiment represented by these words. It may be of some interest that the building in which they appeared was in the administration block of the concentration camp at Dachau (Apple, 1992, quoting Horne, 1986, pp.76).

Recognizing the caution delineated by Apple above, I am convinced that additional research conducted into the basic values of democracy in an attempt to determine what they are would serve a useful purpose. It might help us become clearer about the ideals toward which we strive—but perhaps never quite reach. I think it would be informative, for example, for someone interested in studying democracy to select a different group of scholars and their writings and try to find what they think are the basic democratic values and compare these findings with those reported here. Someone might examine The Universal Declaration of Human Rights developed by the United Nations and identify the basic values

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found therein. It might also be useful to study how various democracies in the world have used these values and adapted them in their own distinctive cultures. But I suspect that, in the final analysis, democracy will always be a prolegomenon, a beginning, a preface, because it is a way of living that "is not selfexecuting," as Adlai Stevenson II (1963) pointed out: "...but we who are its custodians have to make it work, and to make it work, we have to understand it." I would be pleased if this presentation may have made a small contribution to this task.

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The Unexamined Criteria of Judgement in Educational Research: Some Ethical Implications

by Lucy Forsyth Townsend

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While we have modern histories, political, philosophical and educational histories, we still lack one that duly takes into view the education of woman. —George G. Bush, 1889

ine years after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, the Science Press published a two-volume 1245-page treatise by Thomas Woody called *A History of Women's Education in the United States*. In the preface, Woody wrote that he believed the newly passed amendment signaled women's achievement of full equality with males. To Woody, women's educational emancipation was even more fundamental than their political liberty because education was the means by which women had conceived of and were now using their political power (Woody, 1929). Woody was overly optimistic, of course. Had women's equality truly been achieved, historians would have raced to mine the rich veins of historical ore revealed by his treatise. That gold rush would not occur until

the feminist movement of the late 1960s. In fact, those old shafts are still not played out, and Woody's two volumes remain the authoritative history of women's education in the United States.

Why did historians of Woody's day largely ignore his important study? Why did Willard Elsbree, in writing his history of the teaching profession (published ten years later) overlook the contributions of influential teacher educators such as Catharine Beecher and Emma Willard? Why did Lawrence Cremin, in a colonial history of education, mention only six women in nearly 500 pages? (Elsbree, 1939). This article attempts to answer these questions by exploring several unexamined criteria for excellence in educational research. I shall argue that the significance of a research topic and the methodology that is used to research it are determined not by universally recognized criteria of excellence but by specific groups of people who make up a scholarly discipline. Who are the scholars? What are their

current interests? What are the criteria by which they decide whether to accept articles for publication? My discussion will focus specifically on the species of educational research with which I am most familiar—educational history.

The Objective Researcher

In attempting to understand why certain research topics are considered important while others are called trivial, the first criterion to reexamine is the belief that all topics of educational research fall along a continuum—from most important to least important—and that the academic community is objective in its selection of topics to study, projects to fund, and articles to publish in its scholarly journals.

However, an examination of the publications of educational historians belies this assumption. For example, most educators would probably agree that it is important to study the history of teachers and teaching. In such studies, one would perhaps compare and contrast types of persons who entered the occupation,

their motivations for entering the profession over time, their training, and their teaching experiences. Yet Geraldine Clifford pointed out that from the 1930s until the 1970s, studies on the history of the teaching profession usually excluded the study of teachers. She explained that in the few cases where educational historians did speak of teachers, they viewed them as "an occupational group progressing through the seemingly inevitable stages of professionalization" rather than as human beings (Clifford, 1975, p.201). Jurgen Herbst, in his recently published history of the teaching profession, continued this tradition by focusing primarily on only a few persons within the profession. For example, he devoted considerable space to analyzing the rhetoric of educational journalists such as William Woodbridge, political reformers such as Horace Mann, and a few normal school leaders (Herbst, 1989). What he did not explore were the views and experiences of an overwhelming number of women teachers who filled the ranks of the profession.

Oversights of this variety can be attributed to the gender of the historian. In the 1980s, three leading books and four major articles were published comparing teacher stereotypes with the experiences and thoughts of actual groups of teachers; all but one of these were written by women (Hoffman, 1981). My point is not that males are chauvinists. Rather it is that scholars tend to write from a personal per-

spective. Black scholars tend to be interested in Blacks, Hispanics in Hispanics, men in the ideas and actions of men. When there are few Blacks, Hispanics, and women among educational historians, there is little scholarship on these groups. In a recent article, John Rury observed: "It is not educational historians [mostly men]...who reopened the study of women's educational history. The most critical and exacting scholarship on this issue has been produced by women's historians" (Rury, 1984, p. 4). To determine why certain topics are considered significant to an academic community, it is useful to ask: What are the gender, class, race, and religious preferences of most members of this community of scholars?

The More Universal, the Better

A second, unexamined criterion of excellence in educational research is that studies fall along a continuum of universality: weak studies are of interest to a very small group of people while the best topics have universal appeal. However an examination of research topics as well as the interpretations made by educational historians raise serious questions about this assumption.

Early leading historians of education have been much maligned because their histories glorified the development of America's vast systems of public schools as the quintessential expression of American democracy. Celebrationist historians, as they are called, viewed the history of

American public schooling as a steady, triumphant march of progress. To understand why these early historians of education wrote in this manner, Sol Cohen researched the historical context in which a celebrationist historian of education, Ellwood Cubberley, produced his leading texts. Cohen discovered that when Cubberley was hired at Stanford University in 1898, he was given three years to "make the department respectable." Cubberley's students criticized history of education courses as impractical and irrelevant to their lives. In response, Cubberley wrote histories of education in which he shifted the focus from Western Europe to the United States and from intellectual to social history. His focus on the great mission of education was quite similar to that of mainstream American historians who were stressing the great mission of the United States. Cohen's conclusion was that Cubberley's selection and treatment of the history of education grew out of the context in which he worked (Cohen, 1976, pp. 303-305). Cohen also explored a group of historians who disagreed violently with celebrationists like Cubberly. These later historians produced a series of articles and books revealing that the public schools had a long history of prejudice against ethnic and racial minorities, non-protestants, and women. For example, Joel Spring's research on the public schools of Cleveland, Ohio, exposed wide discrepancies in the

distribution of public funds to White and Black schools. Analyzing the methods used in the schools of New York City, Carl Kaestle concluded that education was used not for liberation but for social control. Michael Katz wrote that American public schools had always been "conservative, racist, and bureaucratic." Why did these revisionist historians attack the same institution that Cubberley had glorified? Cohen argues convincingly that revisionist historians began to research and publish during the 1960s when the youth of America were rebelling against the Vietnam War, discrimination against Blacks, and corrupt politicians. Their selection of topics, their methods, and their interpretations grew out of the context of their lives (Spring, 1988, pp. 132-134).

If one traces historical scholarship on women over the last century, one finds that rather than flowing as a continuous stream, it clusters around certain key historical events. Their cluster of studies was published around the time of the first women's rights conference at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. A second cluster of studies appeared around the time of the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (Norton and Berkin, 1979), followed by a long hiatus until the late 1960s when another major feminist movement began. Since that time, historical scholarship on women has become the fastest growing specialty in the discipline. Scholarship on women

flourished when women were agitating to be recognized, not as silent and subservient helpers of men, but as autonomous human beings.

What enabled her to make that hazardous decision was an ethical imperative—that it is better to be inclusive in one's scholarly research than to focus predominately on one privileged group.

This brief historiography of education reveals that scholarly emphases reflect researchers' interests which grow out of the context of their lives. It should be no surprise then that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was followed by a sudden burst of interest in democracy, a topic which had been languishing for some decades. Rather than asking whether a topic can be generalized to all people, it is perhaps better to ask: Does this study have anything to do with what has been happening in education and the world for the past few years?

Methodological Excellence

A third unexamined assumption is that there is a recognized standard by which scholars decide whether a research study is worthy of publication. Research

articles must be well conceived, carefully researched and interpreted, and written in clear and logical prose. The problem with this belief is that it is only partially true. While scholars learn and teach their students to follow general conventions of communication, the specific forms that scholarly studies take vary considerably from one group of researchers to another. Hence, the person who wants to publish an "excellent" study must know the specific conventions of a particular segment of the scholarly community.

For example, scholars who specialize in biographies tend to be interested primarily in the exploration of human character. To publish in the journal *Biography* which is issued by an interdisciplinary community of biographers, the educational researcher must focus more on the personality of the individual than on that person's educational career. However, another community of biographers does not focus primarily on the complexities of human character; instead, its journal *Vitae Scholasticae* usually publishes articles that focus more on the philosophies, educational experiences, or careers of individual educators. A third community of educational historians rarely publishes biographical articles at all. An in-depth study of the articles published in its journal *History of Education Quarterly* over the last ten years reveals that most biographical articles included both an analysis of an individual's personality, a

discussion of some aspect of the individual's career in education and the person's connection to a broad movement in education (Townsend, 1991). In effect, each of these scholarly communities, all of which consider biographical research to be a worthwhile pursuit, has different criteria for judging biographical scholarship.

It seems, then, that rather than asking whether one's research study is excellent, it would be better to ask who is judging it. What kinds of papers are usually presented at annual meetings of a particular society and what kinds of articles are usually published in its journal? A scholarly paper considered excellent by one group may be rejected by another simply because it is too different from that community's interests and methodologies.

Some Ethical Implications

What, then, are some ethical implications that can be drawn from this analysis? The first comments are directed to individual scholars and the second to scholarly communities. A well-known American historian, Gerda Lerner, was born and reared in Austria, where she gained acceptance into a European university. However, the accession of the Nazis forced her to emigrate to the United States where she gave up her educational aspirations to marry and rear a family. She was thirty-nine years of age when she entered an undergraduate program at Columbia University and

seven years later completed her doctorate in history. Lerner knew that she wanted to spend the rest of her career researching and publishing women's history. The problem was that in 1967 women's history was not a popular specialty. Later she wrote:

> After my dissertation defense one of my professors congratulated me and offered what was undoubtedly well-meant practical advice. If I wanted to make a career in the profession commensurate to my talents, I needed only to keep quiet about my "so-called" specialty... Once established, I could then do whatever I wanted about women (Lerner, 1979).

Lerner did not take the professor's advice. She was too old to play career games, she recalled, and she didn't care if she were ever a department chair, dean, or president of a historical society. She believed that she had only twenty years to place women in the mainstream of historical inquiry, and she needed every moment of that time.

Gerda Lerner chose, at great risk to her professional advancement, to challenge the mainstream of her scholarly community. Several decades earlier, Mary Beard, a feminist historian whom Lerner greatly admired, was forced to work outside the academy because she had made a similar choice. Lerner, however, made her decision when a new feminist movement was emerging, and she is now a leading

member of that movement. Gerda Lerner's story turned out well for her, professionally speaking, but she could have been another Mary Beard. What enabled her to make that hazardous decision was an ethical imperative—that it is better to be inclusive in one's scholarly research than to focus predominately on one privileged group. The issue was one of fairness. The same ethical imperative has energized historians to explore the lives of the impoverished, of minority groups, and of children. These studies challenge each of us as individual scholars to re-examine the topics we select for study. In what other ways might we be denigrating groups of Americans by neglecting or stereotyping them?

Yet even if we do re-examine our research topics, we still must face the reality that we are members of scholarly communities. These groups hold annual meetings, elect officers, and on a regular basis select for publication the papers they believe are of interest to the other members of their community.

As this article has argued, the choices they make are not based on a universally recognized objective standard of scholarly excellence but are grounded in part on their gender, their personal interests, and the context of their lives. How can these communities ensure fair conduct?

- By carefully selecting leaders. In an attempt to have diverse representation, sane societies make a concerted at-

tempt to nominate for leadership positions representatives of both genders and a range of ethnic and racial groups.

• By analyzing the contents of its scholarly journal. Over the last decade, what topics and methodologies were published? What were the academic credentials, sex, and race of most published authors? What topics were conspicuous by their absence? The results of such analyses should be discussed with the membership to determine why certain kinds of scholarship or groups are under-represented.

• By mentoring scholars. Scholarly communities need to hold workshops in which the criteria they use in selecting articles for publication are discussed with the membership. Such dialogue opens up the possibility of educating young scholars and exploring the acceptance of new emphases and methodologies.

One would perhaps like to believe that one's educational research is important because it is relevant to all people in all ages. One would also perhaps like to believe that if one is gifted enough and works hard enough, one's scholarship will meet a

universal standard of excellence. Yet as this brief historiography of education has shown, researchers are people who make choices within the context of their experiences. To be ethical researchers, we need to engage in a continual process of examining the criteria we use in our research efforts.

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Literacy as Social Policy: Issues for America in the 21st Century

by B. Allan Quigley

At the time of original publication, B. Allan Quigley was Assistant Professor and Regional Coordinator, Adult Education, Pennsylvania State University.

At the 1924 American Library Association Conference, Alexander Meiklejohn (1924), a leader in the early library movement, concluded a stirring address with the following statement:

Democracy is education. There is only one thing a community can give to its members on a large scale and do it successfully...and that is education. Insofar as we can educate the people, insofar as we can bring people to understanding of themselves and of their world, we can have a democracy. Insofar as we cannot do that, we have got to have control by the few.

Above all, Meiklejohn (1924) stressed that, "A people can be a democracy if it can learn to read. ...I don't believe that any society can be a democracy in any considerable measure at all except as it develops reading." Sixty-one years later, like a prophecy fulfilled, Kozol (1985) observed that the number of illiterate adults in America exceeded the entire electorate in the 1984 Presidential election by 16 million. For Kozol, illiteracy denies full participation in democracy. He explained:

So long as 60 million people are denied significant participation, the government is neither of, nor for, nor by the people. It is a government, at best, of those two thirds whose wealth, skin color, or parental privilege allows them opportunity to profit from the provocation and instruction of the written word.

As America approaches the 21st century with illiteracy rates ranging from 21 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1986) to 60 million (Kozol, 1985), with participation rates in governmentally sponsored Adult Basic Education (ABE) programs as low as 5% (NACAE, 1977), and with attrition rates in ABE as high as 40-60% (Cain & Walen, 1979; Mezirow, Darkenwald & Knox, 1975), it is clear that literacy as social policy has a long way to go in this country before it can be considered 'successful' in any real sense.

> *Sixty-one years later, like a prophecy fulfilled, Kozol (1985) observed that the number of illiterate adults in America exceeded the entire electorate in the 1984 Presidential election by 16 million. For Kozol, illiteracy denies full participation in democracy.*

In this publication concerning international literacy issues, an opportunity arises to examine literacy as social policy in America and in other countries. This brief discussion will address three social policy questions, specifically: (1) What is the history of America's social policy as it relates to literacy? (2) What lessons may be learned from the literacy policy experience of other countries? (3) How can these experiences be interpreted

in social policy terms for America's future?

Social Policy and Literacy for Social Problem-solving

Although there is wide disagreement on definitions of social, public, and welfare policies, social policy is generally considered a component of public policy—a component dedicated to improving some specific aspect of societal conditions. Whereas public policy is considered broad governmental intervention, social policy typically leads to direct/ indirect development of human resources or the redistribution of resources for the goal of human development (Djao, 1983). Health and education are classic examples of social policy arenas. Both have a history of involving varying degrees of governmental action to create and redistribute both valued resources and 'life chances' (Griffin, 1987). As a component of education, literacy has historically been a highly active area of policy formation, touching every corner of the globe, irrespective of political ideology. But, irrespective of political ideology, geography, or time in history, it is important to note that literacy social policy has typically been motivated by social problem-solving purposes.

Dating back to the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation, "then, as now, reformers and idealists . . . have viewed literacy as a means to other ends—whether a more moral society or a more

stable political order. . ." (Arnove & Graff, 1987). In the attempt to attain such social goals, it is important to note that, "far too often, illiteracy has been the scapegoat for other social ills associated with it, but rather than attack the basic maladjustments of society, illiteracy has been the perennial target." (Verner, 1973).

tive context, it is useful to look first at literacy social policy models and experiences of other countries.

Literacy Social Policy Frameworks and Their Applications Internationally

Bhola (1987) suggested that two literacy delivery models can

Area	Model One	Model Two	Model Three
Social Policy:	Market	Progressive – liberal-welfare	Social redistribution
Adult Education (Bhola's adult literacy model)	Vocational – behaviorist	Liberal – humanistic – progressive	Liberatory-social reconstruction
		Motivational developmental	Structural developmental
Sociological Theory:	Structural Functionalism	Structural Functionalism	Conflict Theory

Figure 1
Relationship of Models from Quigley (1989), *Social Policy, Adult Education and Sociological Theory*

Although one may want to think of literacy acquisition as mere cognitive skill development, for social policy purposes literacy has mirrored the hegemony of the day, and, in this, has had a history of hidden and not-so-hidden social agendas based on the normative interpretation of social problems and the perception of the illiterates' role in them.

To examine America's experience, and see it in a compara-

be seen in Third World literacy development: motivational-developmental model and a structural-developmental model. The motivational-developmental model places emphasis on individuals and sees structures as essentially benign. This model typically provides a context of control and seeks vocational-technical functions within specific developmental purposes—third World development projects and programs are exam-

ples. It is expected that the illiterate populace will come forth if the individual benefits are explained or demonstrated. By contrast, the structural-developmental model creates new economic, social, and political structures. In this model, the illiterate populace has a responsibility to participate in these new structures for the benefit of the entire society. The first model has a reformist purpose, the second a revolutionary one. Bhola's models can be placed within a larger framework of social policy (Quigley, 1989), with links to adult education and sociological theory, as shown in Figure I.

In this framework, the three social policy models shown (Griffin, 1987; Jarvis, 1985; Gil, 1976) correspond with three, broad, adult education philosophies of practice (adapted from Elias and Merriam, 1984). The more laissez-faire social policies of the market model expect individual response, encourage individual initiative, and typically seek vocational—behavioristic delivery systems in adult education. In the case of literacy, the market model would coincide with Bhola's motivational—developmental delivery model. The market model frequently provides incentives (real or promised) to participants and bases much of its action and strategic planning on a marketplace rationale with negotiation as the stabilizing mechanism. It understands education as a social policy instrument for the enhancement of productivity and the

economy. Grounded in structural function sociological theory, this model typically promotes literacy education as an investment in human capital. Internationally, India's National Adult Education Program (now renamed Adult Education Program) is an example of this social policy literacy model at work, but it would be safe to expand this statement to literacy movements in most industrialized (Gayfer, 1987) and developing countries (Arnove & Graff, 1987). Developing countries that have had the support of international agencies, such as UNESCO, have often utilized this model for economic development.

The larger Market Model and Bhola's motivational developmental delivery model do not always succeed for literacy. It is useful here to look at one of the most ambitious multi-national literacy initiatives in history as an example. The 1965 Experimental World Literacy Program (EWLP) was a UNESCO experiment that laid the groundwork for a global literacy campaign. This five-year, eleven country experiment raised the expectations and hopes of thousands, if not millions, in countries in Africa, Asia, the Arab states, and Latin America. The apparent seeds of its problems were unwittingly contained in the words of Secretary General U Thant at the Thirteenth Session of UNESCO's General Conference. The EWLP would provide "valuable information on the relationship of literacy with social

and economic development." This proved harder to do than initially imagined. Ultimately, the International Herald Tribune was but one of dozens of sources that declared: "An ambitious UNESCO project to eradicate illiteracy, begun a decade ago, has been a dismal failure, according to the organization's own report" (Freund in Gillette, 1987). While some have argued that its critics have been too harsh (it did, after all, provide literacy to over one hundred thousand people in eleven diverse countries), nevertheless, the impetus failed to lead to a worldwide campaign or sustain momentum in many of the participant countries. Reasons given included that the market model social policy utilized was overly rigid, mechanistic, depended too greatly on human consumption as a motivating factor, frequently ignored the variances of culture, and vastly oversimplified the socio-economic forces that contribute to the conditions that foster illiteracy. As Gillette (1987) summed up the efforts of the EWLP:

The program's basic vocational and productivistic logic made it vulnerable to precisely the kind of stimulus/ response and instrumental thinking that pervaded its evaluation design and the values by which results were judged under that design. Literacy . . . like education more generally, cannot be reduced to behavioral conditioning. It endows people with skills that they can (al-

though do not always) use to receive and emit messages of an almost infinite range, a range that in any event largely escapes the control of those who imparted literacy to them. Literacy is potential empowerment.

The EWLP experience has direct application to U.S. policy, as will be seen.

By contrast, Bhola's structural-developmental program model can be seen to correspond to the broader social redistribution model, shown in Figure I. Here, new structures for the redistribution of resources and life-chances are put in place in an attempt to redress inequality. As Bhola noted, such structures must prove themselves helpful and responsive. The social redistribution model is grounded in conflict theory and, in revolutionary states, can provide enormous participation by learners, but at what human cost? Le Thanh Khoi (1976) has observed that, "up to the present time, revolutionary regimes have been the only ones capable of organizing successful mass literacy campaigns. From the Soviet Union to China, from Vietnam to Cuba, all revolutionary governments have given high priority to the war on illiteracy." The young Soviet republic of 1917-1921 launched a massive literacy drive that was a forerunner to the literacy campaign pattern of Cuba and Nicaragua (Eklof, 1987). However, it must be remembered that this pattern included the fa-

mous (or infamous) 1919 Decree on Illiteracy that made it illegal and a criminal offense to refuse to teach or to study (Eklof, 1987).

If much of America's mainstream adult and continuing education has followed the Progressive-Liberal-Welfare model, would it not be reasonable to assume that literacy might also benefit from this social policy model in reaching adults?

What is germane here for literacy social policy is the social policy perspective. In Cuba, "from the very beginning, the attack on illiteracy was viewed by the Cuban leadership as not simply a technical or pedagogical problem. It was seen as a profoundly political effort, one tied intimately to the revolutionary transformation of society and the economy" (Fagen in Leiner, 1987). Likewise, in China and Nicaragua, conflict theory provided the springboard for structural-developmental literacy policies that again did not see literacy as a technical problem or a vehicle for subordination, but as an opportunity for massive participation in the country's future.

As America approaches the 21st century with mounting illiteracy problems, the limits and strengths of the market and social redistribution models provide a number of lessons. It is significant that Bhola provided no 'middle ground' literacy policy based on a Progressive-Liberal-Welfare model for developing countries. This model has application to the literacy experience of certain industrialized countries (Gayfer, 1987) and has been the philosophical and policy mainstay of the large field of adult and continuing education in America (Elias & Merriam, 1984). It might seem that this would have been the obvious social policy route for literacy in the United States. Surely a populist culture founded on participatory democracy would be an obvious home for policy based on progressive-liberal-welfare ideology—ideology that seeks governmental intervention through new and existing structures and, while far from perfect, seeks levels of participation in the policy process. If much of America's mainstream adult and continuing education has followed the Progressive-Liberal-Welfare model, would it not be reasonable to assume that literacy might also benefit from this social policy model in reaching adults?

Literacy Social Policy in America: Past and Present
The history of literacy and social policy in the United States (Dauksza Cook, 1977; Graff, 1979; Stevens, 1987) reveals that literacy has typically contained a

social problem-solving purpose as discussed; but, unlike certain other industrialized and developing nations (Gayfer, 1987), American literacy social policy has taken a remarkably non-participatory road. Its history reflects Finch's (1984) definition of social policy, "action designed by government to engineer social change as a mechanism for identifying human needs and devising the means to meet them; as a mechanism for solving social problems; as redistributive justice, as the means of regulating subordinate groups." In addition to attempting to solve social problems, America's literacy policies have long been founded on an historical theme of 'regulating subordinate groups'. The beginnings of literacy education in 19th-century America had distinct social engineering and regulating purposes.

The process of becoming literate was itself a process of socialization promulgated by those interested in using the school to resolve social, economic, and political tensions arising from a culturally pluralistic and emerging industrial society. The actions of those who would control the process of schooling and hence the process of becoming literate are seen in relation to nation building, a fervent evangelical Protestantism and technological innovation. All of these provided a foundation upon which reformers could build (Stevens, 1987).

Moving into the 20th century, "literacy could not be promoted or comprehended in isolation from morality" (Graff, 1979); 'morality' meaning, "a mode of conduct and a way of life: habits, values, attitudes, which were based on the cultural necessities of progress and the requirements of society." Few examples are clearer or more dramatic than the turn-of-the-century policies for the regulating of immigrants and their literacy education. With immigrants seen as subordinates, the public sentiment was that "unless we Americanize them, they will foreignize us" (Carlson, 1970). Seeing groups as subordinate has meant regulation based on their non-involvement. Throughout history, neither the learner nor the practitioner (indeed not even the wider field of adult and continuing education nor the public) has participated in open policy formation.

The widespread use of the Adult Performance Level (APL) tests and program in the 1970s, a program whose effect has since been called 'largely salutory,' (Fischer, Haney, & David, 1980, p. 75) is a recent example. The original APL study conducted in Texas was not an educational program and not intended to be one (Fischer et al., 1980). It was a study on functional illiteracy. However, in search of a national program to address literacy levels, an APL educational program was devised, launched before national APL norming tests were completed. Without either advisement or consent, states were expected to utilize funds to support this national program. The APL study was approved in March, 1975, by the United States Office of Education.

With immigrants seen as subordinates, the public sentiment was that "unless we Americanize them, they will foreignize us" (Carlson, 1970).

In April,1975, the Federal Register announced APL as program priority. In less than two months, a test had become a national campaign through "a stroke of marketing genius" (Fischer et al., 1980). All of this happened before the issue was determined, the test fully validated, or the program clearly determined. The bandwagon in search of a corresponding need was abandoned in virtually every state by the early 1980s and added to the shelf of discarded programs designed to meet economic and political needs.

Today, this legacy has moved all the way from nation-building to nation-saving. The recent report *Jump Start: The Federal Role on Adult Literacy* (January, 1989), prepared for the newly inaugurated President, concluded that,

Among the most important things it [America] must do is ensure that the twenty million-plus adults who are seriously deficient in basic skills be-

come fully productive workers and citizens . . . without their best efforts over the next twenty years, there is little hope for the economic and social future of this country (Chisman, 1989).

Today, literacy and basic education programs are held to greater accountability than ever—accountability for resolving massive economic issues far beyond the influences of illiterates and the traditional mechanistic programs in place to somehow address these social policy goals.

Literacy Social Policies for the Future

Niemi and Nagle (1979) astutely noted that, "in every educational setting, an inevitable tension persists among three sets of needs: those felt by the learner, those defined by professional educators, and those derived from institutional and society expectations." The market model for literacy in America, like that employed by the EWLP, has seen needs defined by 'professional educators.' Subsequent literacy solutions have been based on 'societal expectations' throughout the history of literacy education. Although researchers such as Fingeret (1984) have continuously emphasized that

literacy cannot "create additional jobs, solve the problems of crime and malnutrition, nor make the world safe from terrorism."

At no point has literacy had an open public debate, such as that fostered by the "A Nation at Risk" report in the public system. Literacy has been equated with training in the motivational-developmental model of delivery and, by reducing the dynamics of under-education to productivistic issues and behavioristic programs, it has had only the most modest success. America has not employed whole strategies out of the structural-developmental model nor engaged the wider society in a national initiative.

As Fingeret (1983) observed, "part of the problem is that once we recognize the inadequacies inherent in our approach to illiterate adults, we have little to offer in its place." Today, as government literacy policy insists on increased accountability, and as the public grows disenchanted with ABE (Kozol, 1985), practitioners and researchers who seek more innovative programmatic approaches to illiteracy find themselves working at odds with market model-driven governmental policies—policies that should be supporting their efforts. Thus, it is proposed that the fundamental issue for the future is to develop literacy policy out of a so-

cial policy model more commensurate with adults as learners in an open, participatory—even democratic—policy process. Enabling social policy based on learner needs and wider practitioner and public debate could encourage alternate program doors to open and could see increased participation, with no loss of accountability for results.

Thus, it is proposed that space must be made for literacy social policy that derives from a progressive-liberal-welfare model, seriously expands the market model, or adds much wider strategies out of the social distribution model. Social policies are needed that can set programs and local policies in motion with the adult learners contributing to development of their own learning activities—activities that would be both relevant and acceptable. Until a shift takes place in the social policy model utilized, until a policy model appears that is more commensurate with both adult education and the pluralistic nature of policy formation in this country, Meiklejohn's prophecy of 'democracy by the few' will continue into the 21st century.

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Institutional Democracy in Schools

by Mary Anne Raywid

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Different decades have related democracy to education in quite different ways. At various times, we have emphasized democracy within the classroom for students (from the early century into the 1940s) with Progressive Education, democracy within the school for students (in the 1960s), and democracy for communities in relation to schools (also in the 1960s). Currently, attention seems focused on democracy for parents, community, and teachers, but in rather different ways and under several different auspices. This article features present applications, but a bit of the history is also examined as it becomes relevant to illuminating how democracy is being pressed today, for and by community, parents and teachers.

One way to see the Excellence Movement of the last decade, of course, is as a reassertion of the rights of the citizenry at large to control public education. The events constituting the movement, as well as its rhetoric, express the stake of the community (both local and national) in the success of education. In state after state, legislatures and governors have simply taken leadership away from educators and school officials. They have done so with laws imposing new curricula, accountability measures, discipline, attendance policies, etc. Those aware of the long-felt concerns about democracy's viability within the expert society, and those who have feared the triumph of the technocracy, have strongly reasserted the right of political leaders to intervene and assume control of public schools. In state after state, they have thus imposed a new balance (or reversed the imbalance, as some would say) between professional and lay control of this particular public institution.

A number of states have now adopted explicit provisions to the effect that they will take over 'academically bankrupt' school districts, removing them from local control altogether. One way to understand the Excellence Movement is to say that, in metaphorical terms, this is actually what it has sought to do regarding most districts—albeit indirectly—in perhaps most states. As the rhetoric shows, there have been two reasons.

One is a very real and substantial concern about the quality of education. But a second has been about the right of the public, as opposed to the professionals, to run public institutions.

> *The idea of choice among public schools is not a new one, but it is only within the past decade that it has come to be taken very seriously by large numbers as a way to articulate school systems.*

The assertion of democracy for parents, as contrasted with democracy for the citizenry, generally has taken quite different form. Although some still seek fuller representation in the councils where school policy is set, others have despaired of the possibility that involvement and participation can get very far and have turned to other means in-

stead. One feature of the site management proposal to be discussed below is that all schools have School Advisory Councils which include parent representatives. Some envision such an arrangement as a democratization of the policy process, while others are convinced that the Councils themselves may remain peripheral to the major decisions, with trivialized agendas and involvement without real influence.

This had led a number of people to look instead to quite a different sort of way to re-assert democracy for parents and to allocate authority appropriately between parents and school officials. This is the proposal that public schools diversify and that families be given the right to choose among them. This way, advocates claim, the advantages of professional judgment and insight can be retained, while acknowledging appropriate parent prerogatives as well (Raywid, 1987).

The idea of choice among public schools is not a new one, but it is only within the past decade that it has come to be taken very seriously by large numbers as a way to articulate school systems. Last year's Gallup Poll showed that 71% of those questioned believe public school parents should be able to choose their children's schools (Gallup & Clark, 1987). Indeed, there was more agreement as to the desirability of this arrangement than there was on anything else the pollsters asked about schools! Thus, choice now appears a

widely accepted means of democratizing school control. Approximately half the states now have choice provisions of one kind or another, and they are under consideration in other states as well (Nathan, 1988).

The extent of both of these departures from traditional arrangements—the heightened state control, and the new choice opportunities—suggest considerable dissatisfaction with the way in which schools are externally controlled and rendered accountable to their publics. These certainly are moves representing one sort of institutional democratization attempt.

But, perhaps the most novel developments with respect to institutional democracy for schools are taking place within them. These relate to the insistence that schools need 'restructuring' and that teachers must be 'empowered.' Often (but not always) asserted in tandem, both are extraordinary sorts of proposals. The demand that schools be restructured is frequently a demand that we start all over with respect to organizing them, changing, for example such fundamental 'givens' as the way youngsters are grouped into grades, the way teachers work and are assigned, and the way subject matter and time are apportioned. But at least equally often, the demand that schools be restructured is a demand for a re-distribution of school authority so that individuals share in exercising that control. Only two models for accomplishing this purpose have so

far been elaborated. One is school-based or site management; the other is the choice arrangement.

Perhaps the most novel developments with respect to institutional democracy for schools are taking place within them. These relate to the insistence that schools need 'restructuring' and that teachers must be 'empowered.'

The site management proposal seeks to shift power (if not always authority) from state and district levels to individual schools. Within the school, a School Advisory Council deliberates school policy. Its members include teachers, parents, and sometimes other community members, as well as students. Certainly, the idea has the democratic flavor of returning power to its grass roots, and it reflects the participatory democrat's conviction that those to be affected by a decision should participate in shaping it.

'Restructuring' is the dominant theme of the current phase of the reform movement, and site management is perhaps its most popular and dramatic embodiment. We hear exciting reports

of what is happening in Dade County and Rochester and Toledo and Hammond, Indiana. It remains to be seen, however, just how much authority will devolve to individual schools (or how much power district officials are willing to delegate to them), and the extent to which newly acquired power and authority will actually be shared. A lot hinges on the School Advisory Councils, the way they are constituted, and the details of their role. Where they are elected bodies involving teachers and parents, and are responsible for policy decisions including the naming of the principal, those interested in institutional democracy might find much to celebrate. On the other hand, where School Advisory Councils are appointed by the principal, sit at his/her pleasure, and are advisory only, institutional democracy advocates may be very disappointed in the outcomes (Raywid, 1988).

The choice idea holds promise, but it is not a 'fail-safe' proposal either. (Would that there were one!) Certainly, the opportunity to choose one's school—and the opportunity to leave one—represents substantial *prima facie* empowerment for parents and students, and for teachers as well in districts where they, too, have such power. Moreover, choice entails school-to-school diversification, and the sustenance of uniqueness requires decentralization of authority. Furthermore, the need to establish unique programs calls for

the involvement of teachers in program design and implementation.

There is currently a great deal of talk about 'teacher empowerment' and this is perhaps the most dramatic current move toward institutional democracy.

But not all choice plans have honored these logical necessities. For instance, some have overlooked diversification and have been no more than 'open enrollment' plans—denying real choice, in effect, by failing to provide genuine alternatives among which to choose. Others have attempted to diversify but have done so by imposing district-designed programs on unwilling schools and teachers. So with the choice plan, as with the site management plan, whether it will mean an enhancement of institutional democracy depends finally on the implementation details.

There is currently a great deal of talk about 'teacher empowerment' and this is perhaps the most dramatic current move toward institutional democracy. But it is interestingly devoid of assertions of that connection. The need to empower teachers is not being argued in the name of

democratizing the workplace—but rather to the purpose of enhancing the general organizational effectiveness of schools, or more specifically of increasing teacher efficacy and thus student accomplishment (Conley et al., 1988; Maeroff, 1988; Rosenholtz, 1987). The case is being made, then, primarily on pragmatic grounds, not grounds of principle. For our time, at least, perhaps it will prove a stronger, more persuasive case.

An argument for teacher empowerment constructed from principle would appear a rather strange anomaly for today—and this for several reasons. In the first place, little attention has ever been paid to institutional democracy for teachers. The matter was apparently settled in the 19th century with the adoption of the business model for running schools; just as the boss has the right to run his/her business, the administrator acquired the right to run the school. The talk of 'industrial democracy' in the early 20th century seems to have had little impact on within-school governance. Indeed, even John Dewey, who was an active member of the League for Industrial Democracy, seems barely to have addressed its implications for schools. His sole direct discussion of the matter, "Democracy and Educational Administration," did not appear until 1937. In it, he noted that democracy for students seemed to have made considerably more progress than democracy for the teaching staff (Dewey, 1971). And, although

there was some subsequent interest in democratizing the practice of school administration (largely in the 1940s and 1950s), it was generally understood that this should involve administrator comportment and delegation, not actual changes in the locus of authority (Hoy & Miskel, 1987).

So we have never had a tradition of applying the ideas of institutional democracy to teachers. But even had we had one in the past, the 1980s have hardly been an era of democratization for *anyone*. (Of course, there are those who would insist that the deregulation, reassertion of employer rights, and expansion of the prerogatives of the powerful do indeed represent democratization. Obviously, a somewhat different conception of democracy is represented here.) Those who can remember the 1960s must see the two ensuing decades as a period of retreat from the democratic emphases of that era—the protests and revolts and the demands for empowerment, the talk of participatory democracy, and the search for new social forms free from the rigidity and oppression of the old ones. Such sentiments were often addressed explicitly at schools, and they were paralleled and strengthened by the broader civil rights thrust in government and society. The result was that by the end of the decade, even many of those schools with little direct sympathy for participatory democracy had taken a more empathetic look at the plight of their students and responded with new found

concern and compassion. Civil rights legislation had, of course, forced some to this by emphasizing the entitlements of specific groups—racial minorities, women, the handicapped. And it was a period when we were generally forced to become much more conscious of the *rights* of individuals and groups—as underscored by legislatures and courts as well as by philosophers, social theorists, and leaders.

There is certainly evidence of a current press in schools for arrangements and practices that would accord with the development of institutional democracy.

The tide turned in the 1970s, however, and students have fared less well for more than a decade now. There are currently few indications of a reversal in the offing that would enhance institutional democracy from their perspective. Indeed, current protagonists in the ongoing educational debate who agree on little else often share the conviction that the empowering of students in the 1960s and the 'democratization' of the curriculum permitting them to choose their own, were the precursors to serious difficulties. If so, we have now amended the situation with many states not only curtailing the number of electives, but also in-

creasing the total number of courses required for graduation. New dress and attendance and discipline codes have also led to a narrowing of the range of all kinds of choices for youngsters in schools. And while school officials and legislatures narrowed the scope of student rights and prerogatives, the courts sustained and legitimized such moves.

A succession of cases has reasserted the role of schools in exercising authority over the young and in viewing students as charges to be imbued with 'the shared values of a civilized social order,' rather than as young citizens enjoying constitutional rights and protections. (The phrase is that of Justice Byron White in his opinion on one of the more recent and important such cases, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 1988.) And even though they may deplore the Excellence Movement's 'get tough' stance, many educators share the idea that the rights orientation has been ill-advised for handling the student-school relation, and welcome a return to a greater emphasis on student responsibilities than on their rights (Grant, 1981).

This is the orientation which began to appear prevalent as of the mid-1970s and it continues today. There have been voices, of course, that would challenge it, but in recent decades, they have not often prevailed in the setting of educational policy. Nevertheless, their role in maintaining the theme of institutional

democracy for schools has been important. Arthur Wirth is widely recognized as the nation's most sustained and prolific contributor to the cause of workplace democracy for educators (1983; 1988), and its challenge has been a recurring focus of Arthur Brown as well (1979; 1980). At least one scholar, George Wood, is also working even more directly to empower teachers and students through an active Institute for Democracy in Education he has established at Ohio University. Moreover, positions and projects pursued by the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers have involved both of these organizations quite directly in efforts to restructure schools and to have teachers share leadership within them—a significant departure from the industrial union model which both seem to have pursued in the recent past. Thus, despite the fact that institutional democracy concerns have claimed little direct mention in the educational debates of recent years, they have not been missing. It is quite possible that they are about to assume increasing prominence as we hear fresh proposals for some of the arrangements institutional democracy would recommend.

We in education have a habit of returning to earlier arrangements and practices years later, and re-inventing them in the name of new goals and concerns. Thus, we have just re-summoned 'houses' or 'schools within schools' as ways to personalize school, or ways to generate innovation; and we are even re-discovering interest and motivation as the key to greater educational accomplishment—even though we are likely to refer to it instead as 'engagement.' Skeptics dismiss such revisiting as notions tried, failed, and hence doomed. But a proposal's chances for success may improve when suffused with new and different purposes, and placed in a new, temporal and cultural context, and perhaps even endowed with a bit of new knowledge.

The term 'industrial democracy' is rarely heard today. Yet one hears much of 'restructuring' and 'teacher empowerment' and 'participatory decision-making' and 'decentralization' and 'school-based management.' Although not all the advocates of each of these proposals embrace the goals of industrial or institutional democracy, some apparently do. While examination of the current scene probably would not sustain Carl Becker's optimism that history marks the evo-

lutionary expansion of democracy, there is certainly evidence of a current press in schools for arrangements and practices that would accord with the development of institutional democracy there.

As the foregoing also suggests, there is evidence of cycles or pendular swings in educational fashion such that the strong humanistic impulses of one period are likely to be overwhelmed if not explicitly repudiated and reversed by the next. We seem to move back and forth between a product or outcomes focus and a process preoccupation concerned with the quality of the arrangements and practices constituting school. Institutional democracy has been more likely to get attention in the latter, process periods. Yet, as I have tried to show, it has recently proved of interest, even during the current decade's intense product orientation, as a way to enhance product quality. Just possibly, the developments mentioned here may yield a renewed interest in process, where the ideas of teacher empowerment and industrial democracy are viewed desirable in their own right, not simply as means to other ends.

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Humanity's Final Exam

by Buckminster Fuller

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In 1927, I set out deliberately to pay attention to the complete interrelatedness of everything. That is, instead of being a specialist, I decided to look at Spaceship Earth (a term that I invented in 1951) as a whole, at the total resources and total know-how, and to use them for the total success of all humanity.

In 1786, the Scottish poet Robert Burns said, "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us/To see oursels as others see us." To facilitate humanity's comprehension of its present status in Universe, what we need is a physical means of seeing ourselves as others see us. Burns' wish was partially fulfilled in 1969 when, for the first time, humans from our Planet Earth standing on the Moon took colored moving pictures of the Earth and dispatched the pictures back to us electromagnetically, to be seen over anybody's and everybody's properly-tuned-in television sets.

Most people would say that if you want to have the best map of the world, use a globe, the bigger, the better. The trouble with the globe is that you cannot possibly see all the world displayed on it at any one time. Without revolving the globe, you cannot read names identifying the geographical data of more than one-quarter of the surface at a time. Because humans want to see their whole Earth at once, cartographic projections of the Earth's surface were developed. The Mercator Map is the most frequently used and is as yet to be found in schools around the world. On it, Greenland is bigger than South America, North America bigger than Africa, although the contrary is in fact the case. There is no Antarctic continent, and the land on the left end of the map, in fact adjacent to that on the right end, seems to be 24,000 miles away. With only one exception, all the well-known cartographic projects either chop world data into a number of separately viewed parts or produce badly distorted images. The lone exception is the Fuller Dymaxion Projection, designed to provide a satisfactory means for humanity to see correctly the entire surface of the world at one time. With the Dymaxion Map, humans can, for the first time in history, see their whole Planet Earth's geography displayed on one flat surface without any visible distortion in shape or relative size of any of its data, and without any breaks in the continental contours. The whole world can be seen simultaneously as one-world island in one-world ocean.

The Dymaxion Map is a powerful tool for a great world logistics game called the World Game which, using the total inventory of world-around resources and human trends and needs, explores ways to make it possible for every world human to enjoy the total Earth without interfering with each other, and without any human gaining at the expense of any other.

The general assumption of the great political and religious power structures is that a fundamental inadequacy of physical support for human life exists on our planet, that it has to be you or me, not enough for both. They are wrong. Because of the ever-increasing strength and performance per pound and cubic inch of the new chemistries, metallic alloys and electronics, we now have the capability of producing and sustaining a higher standard of living for all humanity than has ever been experienced by

any. This is not an opinion or a hope. It is an engineeringly demonstrable fact. It can be done while phasing out forever any further use of fossil fuels or nuclear power, using only already proven technology and physical resources already mined, refined and in circulation. This physical success is inherently sustainable for all humanity and all its generations to come, and it can be accomplished in ten years through a design science revolution.

A design science revolution will develop artifacts so efficient that they will be adopted spontaneously by all humanity. It will result in an ever healthier, ever less environmentally-restrained, better informed and comprehensively productive total humanity operating as an ever more mutually trusting and considerate world family, living in an ever more generous and less wasteful way at an ever more foresighted and comprehensively participatory level, in an ever more truly loving, classless, raceless human family, all engaged in local Universe information gathering and local Universe problem solving, this being the function which occasioned the inclusion of humans in the design of the Universe.

Evolution has accelerated into revolution. If it is a bloody revolution, with the bottom attempting vengefully to pull the top down, it will render humanity extinct. We will have failed our final exam. If it is a design revolution, joyfully elevating the bottom, all humanity will win.

There can be no planetary equity until all the 150 sovereign nations dividing our planet are abolished. We have today 150 supreme admirals and only one ship: Spaceship Earth. The 150 admirals, each in their stateroom, are trying to run their staterooms as if they were ships. The Starboard Side Admirals' League is trying to sink the Port Side Admiral's League, but if either were successful in sinking the enemy side, the whole ship would be lost.

Humanity will perish on this planet if the sovereignty of nations is not abandoned, and if world-around computerized time-energy accounting is not inaugurated immediately.

The division of world political power into 150 sovereign nations is the consequence of thousands of years of contriving on the part of history's most powerful leaders, whose number one strategy has always been "Divide to conquer, keep divided to keep conquered." The prime vulnerabilities of humanity which make it subject to spontaneous self-dividing are those such as different speech patterns, skin colors, religions, social customs, class or caste systems, political prefer-

ences, and all varieties of troubles, suffering and discontent. The historical consequences of the aeons-ago-employed, number-one strategy accounts for the "natural" acceptance today by world peoples of the seemingly "God given" existence of 150 sovereign nations, as well as all the specialized categories of human activities.

It is highly relevant to the foregoing that in 1959, science incontrovertibly demonstrated that all the known anthropological and biological case histories of extinctions of tribes and species have been brought about by over-specialization resultant upon either willful or environmentally-induced inbreeding. We inbreed special capability by outbreeding general adaptability. Here lies the present chief peril of the human passengers of Spaceship Earth.

There is but one family of humans on Spaceship Earth. Ample food and growing capacity exists to feed every human, but the sovereign nations and their international-trade-balancing system prevent the distribution of food. We can live luxuriously entirely on our daily income of energy from the radiation of the sun and from gravity; the quantity of energy arriving as radiation from the sun aboard planet Earth every minute is greater than all the energy used by humanity in a year. But big government can see no way to collect taxes to run its bureaucracy if people are served directly and individually by their daily

energy income, and money-makers cannot find a way to put meters between people and the sun and the wind.

Humanity will perish on this planet if the sovereignty of nations is not abandoned, and if world-around computerized time-energy accounting is not inaugurated immediately. World Game has demonstrated that the first step in the integration of the world is the closing of the gaps in the world energy system. This will effectively counter the peril of over-specialization of humans, and will be the beginning of omni-energy accounting for world economic management.

Until 20 years ago, the limitation of deliverability of electric power by wire was 350 miles. To get greater mileage, you needed higher voltage, and the higher the voltage, the more problems with insulation and so forth. Due to the space program and the development of new materials, all kinds of new insulating capabilities came in; and 20 years ago, we came to what is called ultra high voltage and superconductivity: It then became practical to deliver power 1500 miles.

In the electricity generating game, industry is the biggest cus-tomer. You need a lot of standby power to meet the peak demand. In America, fifty percent of the time, fifty percent of the generating capacity is not being used. It was Wendell Wilkie who discovered that the next town over might have different peaks and valleys in its use of electricity. Generating more power than is bought is pure loss. By integrating electrical networks with other towns, Wilkie discovered that what was not being sold locally could be sold elsewhere. Thus the extra generating capacity became part of the profit.

With a maximum range of 350 miles, you couldn't reach across time zones. With 1500 miles, not only could time zones in the United States be crossed, but we could reach Alaska and, from Alaska, across to eastern Kamchatka. The Russians had already been moving further and further eastward, putting dams in all their northern flowing rivers. With a range of 1500 miles, we could reach the Russian grid.

It was clear that if we integrated with them, we'd use the other half of our generating capacity, doubling our capacity overnight. Pierre Trudeau, former prime minister of Canada, is a friend of mine. When he was invited to Russia for his very first visit, I took my Dymaxion World Map and put the electrical grid on it. It showed that once Russia was reached, you could go south and reach China, go into Europe and Africa. We could hook up the whole Earth's power system. Trudeau took this to Brezhnev, who turned it over to his engineers, who reported back to him that it was feasible and desirable. The minute we put all humanity on the same electrical network, all problems and differences with money exchange will completely disappear. Energy will be the base, cost-per-kilowatt-hour will be it for everyone. Nothing is going to remove the political barriers faster than this.

Since I have learned that the economic success of all humanity is feasible, it is clear that the Universe is trying to make humanity a success despite itself. Integration of all humanity's vital interests around Planet Earth involves doing away with the 150 sovereign states, wherefore world revolution is at hand. Either all lose, or all win.

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Including African-American Values
In Educational Discourse:
Toward A Multicultural Public Philosophy

by Kodzo Tita Pongo

At the time of original publication, Kodzo Tita Pongo, Ph.D. was at Chicago State University, Chicago, Illinois.

Self reflectivity is central to genuine liberation. No so-called objective social analysis has ever delivered on its claim to provide predictive knowledge of social life. Ongoing reflective cognition and liberation by those struggling for emancipation must become the center of any transformative analysis of society. Liberation from the lived contradictions and dominative relations that mark society in the United States today requires self-conscious agents who understand dialectically the conditions in which they find themselves embedded. Only critical self-reflection can discern and uncover the ideological distortions that ratify undemocratic conditions. This kind of cognitive distance, called for by Critical Theory, has rarely been tried in America, even by those struggling toward liberation. Instead, we see oversimplified versions of oppression.

There has been no more difficult, or perhaps wrongheaded, task in American intellectual history than to give a really "unbiased" single account of the historical experience and struggles of African-Americans. Such analysts, whether black or white, are always and already shaped by natural biases arising from their own idiosyncratic location and experience in the social order. Some analysts have suggested giving up all claims to objectivity and have declared themselves on the side of honest, if unreflective, protest. Yet in a democratic environment, particularly in academic settings, this is not the most appropriate route to take. This kind of protest as the final word is a stopper to fruitful conversation and therefore to change.

The rich variety of liberating social analyses at our disposal should not be cast aside in favor of simplistic 'honest' representations of social crimes against African-Americans. These methods must be retained if we are to achieve critical distance from the conditions we face. Through them, we can sustain our quest for a more complex honesty which can then lead us to change.

In this analysis, therefore, I shall proceed in two main directions. First, I shall discuss the development of African-American values and their impact on African-American attitudes toward education. By values here, I mean mental attitudes or abstract ideals by which to judge whether certain kinds of behavior are acceptable or unacceptable. It is by these values that the individual's ideal modes of conduct are directed toward the attainment of life goals. Second, I shall recommend the direction we should take in order to create a more harmonious community. Appropriating themes from Walter Lippmann, I argue that what we need is a new public philosophy which includes the perspectives of diverse communities.

This analysis is rooted in my own social environment, an environment which arises from my existential situation as it is conditioned by the academic environment in which I work. This approach, I believe, is appropriate to the subject matter I intend to explore.

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The Shaping of African-American Educational Values

By referring to African-American values, I do not intend to imply that African-Americans constitute a homogeneous community with a defined set of values. They are as heterogeneous as any other group of people. My point here is to identify some of the defining aspects of American Black experience and show how different communities have adjusted to these situations. Thus, my reference to "African-American" refers to people with similar historical experiences rather than to a people with a unified set of values. Acknowledging that individuals respond to the same situation in different ways, it is important first to investigate the conditions being responded to instead of seeking the full range of specific responses.

Every representation of reality, whether social or theoretical, arises from a particular social context. Whatever one presently perceives as reality already depends on intuitions of truth long since informed by physical and social upbringing and surroundings. So, although culture is learned, it cannot be changed merely through increased intellectual understanding.

When African-American slaves were excluded from formal education, when it was a crime punishable by lynching for a slave to learn to read, and when later, though no longer a crime for the descendants of the slaves

to read and write, they were still excluded from the schools, African Americans sought to establish their own schools. Sometimes they had the assistance of philanthropic organizations or religious groups such as the Quakers. Usually, they had only hostility from white society.

The African-American family, so disrupted under slavery, developed its values under particularly inhumane conditions. These were also non-public conditions.

The domestic conditions of black Americans discouraged even informal education. The African-American family, so disrupted under slavery, developed its values under particularly inhumane conditions. These were also non-public conditions.

This history of tragedy and injustice is also a history of the consequences of uprootedness. Slaves were a collection of distinct peoples uprooted from their cultures and environments and transplanted to a different and hostile cultural environment. As W.E.B. DuBois described it in *The Souls of Black Folk*:

> After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh

son, born with a veil and gifted with second sight in this American world – a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness – as American, a Negro; two souls; two thoughts; two unreconciled strings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois, 1953, 16-17).

Here, DuBois describes the strong sense of the inner estrangement and societal alienation that the African-American encounters. It is not possible to attain self-integration in such an environment. Again, DuBois's powerful description has never been surpassed:

> The history of the American Negro is a history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and a truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost ... He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit

upon by his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face (p. 17).

Such a consciousness is one of protest—protest against mental and physical enslavement and discrimination. No people, however, can exist solely by protest; they must act. But to act in a situation in which they have no control may be impossible and will certainly be dangerous. Even under the conditions of this cruel double bind, identifiable African-American cultural values have been forged over the years. Among them are:

1) *Racial thinking.* This naturally developed as a defense mechanism and it presents Blacks with a dilemma. One may believe in individual self-reliance and racial equality but one is constantly challenged to justify one's position as a member of a racial group. Racial thinking as a counter to racism has led to the contemporary expressions of black-nationalism called "Afrocentricism."

2) *Conceptions of social and economic justice.* The African-American community has developed a strong sense of justice—justice as self-affirmation and as the acknowledgment of one's humanity and the humanity of others. Justice is understood largely as keeping the doors of opportunity open in the economic and political spheres.

3) *Commitment to community.* Against the oppressive structures of society, communal bonding has been a source of security. One can perceive in the Black community a pervasive sense of community (perhaps one of the vestiges of their African past).

4) *Passion for religion.* African people in America turned to the God of their oppressors for deliverance. In time, an appropriated Christian tradition became the dominant force in African-American spirituality, as well as in social and political organization.

These values have tended to form a culture within a culture, a political culture hidden from the public square. The dominant white class in this country, which controls the political, economic, and industrial resources of the nation, remains blind to or subordinates the values of minority groups.

When a minority group, drawing from its own experience and values, can criticize the false claims about its inferiority and identify the objective grounds of its exclusion, its members have a solid basis for protest. These protests, however, are taken by the majority as being merely disruptive of an acceptable social order. Since a people (as we have seen) cannot survive on protest alone, an uneasy compromise will be attempted in terms of its hard-won values. As in any one-sided agreement,

the side with less power inevitably loses ground to the one in power. Thus, compromise is often correctly viewed by the minority group members as an imposed abdication of its deepest beliefs. The result can be cynicism or despair.

Cultural Literacy as a New Public Philosophy

Out of this dilemma, African-American communities have developed two distinct value systems, along with their respective conceptions of leadership. Those who respond with rage and protest call themselves "separatists." They advocate a rejection of mainstream America as the only way to overcome Black cultural and economic subjugation. Among other things, this group advocates African-centered rather than European-centered education.

There are those on the other hand who argue that, to paraphrase Rodney King, "We are all stuck here together and we must find a way to get along." They hold out for inter-racial solutions to the destructive problems facing black people, indeed all people, in America today. From this perspective, I intend to argue for an educationally based public philosophy.

I believe that fruitful interracial dialogue is possible and that a central agency for this dialogue is to be found in our educational system. The basic route to fruitful dialogue is to be found in our educational system. The basic route to fruitful dialogue is what

Professor Jeanne Chall calls "world knowledge" and Professor E.D. Hirsch calls "cultural literacy" (Hirsch, 1987). Professor Cornel West perhaps best captures what I'm talking about in his call for "the politics of conversion" (West, 1993).

When I use the term cultural literacy, I mean something that goes beyond a mere emphasis on "skills" and which includes Hirsch's "network of information that all competent readers possess." The culturally literate person must co-possess, with other citizens, a background of information that makes it possible to read, listen, and communicate with others and to grasp the implications of the social debates which bear on his or her interests. Achieving high cultural literacy is a necessary condition for open and public interracial dialogue.

The key to creating such a communicative society is, of course, to change the political culture of members of the society. This seems almost an impossible task. How do you change relations between human beings entrenched in unequal class and racial relations? Human minds and hearts are not machines with replaceable parts. The character of individuals in a community are formed through habitual responses to the perceived social environment. Broad response patterns are expressed individually in the diverse persons who constitute the society.

The call for cultural literacy which I support comes down to an educational recommendation which is equally and inherently also a call for a new public philosophy. We are already in the process of evolving such a new public philosophy although we may not call it that. It is designated by various names. Some call it "multiculturalism"; others use the disdainful term, "political correctness." I call it "intercultural dialogue."

The restoration of the public philosophy cannot occur through moral preaching or reintroducing religious indoctrination into our public and political institutions, as some conservative politicians suggest.

Appropriating Walter Lippmann

In his *The Public Philosophy*, Walter Lippmann called in the 1930s for a renewal of a public philosophy which, even by his time, had all but disappeared. He comes down to arguing that all citizens have an equal moral right to make representation of their interests and values in the public square. Some would argue that America has never really had such a philosophy in the first place. Lippmann knew that the

confidence in a democratic public philosophy could not be renewed by exhortation no matter how eloquent, or by pointing to the "enormity of the present danger." He was not claiming that unless we renew something called the public philosophy (assuming that we could agree on one) this society would surely disintegrate. He argued only that, given our educational and political aspirations, we had a chance.

Secondly, according to Lippmann, we cannot renew the public philosophy by "lamentations about the glory and the grandeur that are past." In addition to Lippmann's two disclaimers, I shall add a third. The restoration of the public philosophy cannot occur through moral preaching or reintroducing *religious indoctrination* into our public and political institutions, as some conservative politicians suggest. I stress *indoctrination* here in view of the recognition that there is such religious and ideological diversity among citizens that any appeal to religious fundamentalism would be dangerous to a public philosophy. Religion, taken as the basis of culture, can be destructive to the very foundation of a democratic culture.

Religious or spiritual values, however, are not irrelevant. We must perhaps learn to be religious humanly rather than human religiously. To be human religiously is to have the inclination to impose one's religious beliefs and values on an unwilling soci-

ety. On the other hand, to be religious humanly is to have deep respect for other people's traditions. Men and women today have "low capacity to believe in the invisible, the intangible, and the imponderable." We resent any imposed precepts which might restrict our private interests and desires. Clearly, the public philosophy of a free and democratic society cannot be restored by fiat. As Lippmann puts it:

> To come to grips with the unbelief which underlies the condition of anomy, we must find a way to re-establish confidence in the validity of public standards. We must renew the convictions from which our political morality springs (1955, p.88).

Such public standards today must include feminist thought. Feminist arguments have been part of public debate in the United States as far back as 1775 when, during the American Revolution, proposals were made to grant women full citizenship. The proposals did not become part of the American Constitution. Over 200 years later, we are still faced with the subordination of women. A reconstructed public philosophy must endeavor to advocate for a moral equality that includes men, women and children. Insofar as the ultimate goal of feminism is to enhance the well-being of all human persons, it can play an important role in formulating the new public philosophy.

The Role of the School

A new public educational philosophy must be pursued through interracial and inter-cultural as well as intergender dialogue. The first and primary condition for such a dialogue is the acceptance of the pluralistic nature of our society. This necessarily means that truth must be deabsolutized. All human cultures are in the pursuit of truth.

Religious or spiritual values, however, are not irrelevant. We must perhaps learn to be religious humanly rather than human religiously. To be human religiously is to have the inclination to impose one's religious beliefs and values on an unwilling society. On the other hand, to be religious humanly is to have deep respect for other people's traditions

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In public discourse, all truths are local and self-regarding. Principles are, in part, rationalizations of some specific interest. My own specific interest, as I see it, is to call for interracial and intergender dialogue through educational programs aimed toward a widely shared cultural literacy.

Truth claims, understood as local and specific, cannot be presented in the public arena as absolutes nor, therefore, as exclusive or universal. No fixed public criteria for policy can be imposed on the general populace "beyond that which the preponderant mass of voters, consumers, readers, and listeners happen at the moment to be supposed to want."

Fruitful dialogue can take place when citizens are educated to interpret and to be open to truth claims as relative to cultural context. Public dialogue, therefore, cannot begin in a general discussion of assumed universal meanings regarding human life and how it ought to be lived. Every cultural group begins that discussion from its own perspective and for its own communities. What then is there left to talk about in the public arena?

The following are some essential insights of a cultural literacy approach through which schools can prepare students for their roles as citizens/speakers on public issues:

- Dialogue is often a messy and confusing learning process. We all need permission to learn from our own mistakes and from the mistakes of others. A major public virtue is tolerance for ambiguity.
- Interracial dialogue is crucial to the future of the nation. Dialogue is a learning process that must be nurtured within as well as across cultural and racial groups. Teachers can guarantee safe

and responsive space within which to explore and articulate experiences and value systems.

- The moral equality of all persons must be respected. Minority members especially must be assured that they will be treated as persons who *belong* as equals in every aspect of their humanity. All must feel safe enough to confront perceived instances of insincerity, dishonesty, or mistrust in service of a favorable environment for dialogue.
- The norms of inquiry and debate will be consistently applied and publicly stated to all speakers. The contributions of individuals will not be based on selected, surface, cultural ideals or styles, nor on the extent to which an individual differs from the perceived ideals of his or her cultural, racial, or gender group.

Conclusion

Human behavior can only approximate the ideals of any community. A multiculturally based cultural literacy approach is not about imposing new orthodoxies. Honest dialogue de-

mands that we must compare our ideals to other people's ideals, and our practices with other practices. We may then recognize that we are closer in our deeper commitments than we could ever have conceived.

Taken together, the above listed features of this version of cultural literacy could provide a springboard for a new public philosophy. The core values of genuine multicultural education are: (1) appreciation of cultural diversity, (2) recognition that we have responsibility toward the world community, (3) reverence for our rich cultural and natural environments, and (4) appreciation of gender differences. These four core values are, I believe, fundamental, political values as well. They are grounded on multiple, historical perspectives which could help strengthen the cultural consciousness of all ethnic groups through intelligent intercultural contact.

Multicultural education, so conceived, affirms a contextual approach which gives the awareness that, as humans, we are dependent on our social, natural, and cultural environments and that our environments in turn are dependent on and are shaped by

our actions and relations. This might increase our awareness of the shared stakes in the ecological crisis and spur us on to develop mutual norms for the care of our natural environment. Thus, African-American spiritual values, racial consciousness, and concepts of community may be publicly integrated with the values of the wider American society. We may yet constitute an integrated cognitive and value system capable of revolutionizing our educational system and our public life.

Such an integrated public and educational philosophy is, at its center, a quest for justice. The fundamental principle of justice is the recognition of a person as a historical subject and not as a thing or an object. To see each other as persons, we must be engaged in communication. Interracial/intercultural dialogue will enable our human community to attain some kind of overarching and yet pluralistic unity—a unity in our affirmed and appreciated diversity.

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Education for Peace

by Benjamin Spock, M.D.

Benjamin Spock is an author and peace activist. He is perhaps the world's best known "baby doctor."

I'm a strong believer in relevance in education. And what's more relevant than staying alive? I mean that the greatest threat to all our lives is nuclear annihilation—through a spreading war or the miscalculation of some leader afraid of being called a helpless giant, or the sudden insanity (it happens to people all the time) of a key general, or simply a mechanical failure. We've become accustomed to living with this unprecedented threat, as unfortunately we become hardened to anything that continues to exist long enough, but we are coping with it.

Our only chance of survival, I think, is to bring up a new generation of children with a different attitude. For it seems to be hopeless to try to get governments to disarm; those of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. have congratulated themselves generously for negotiating two stages of nuclear disarmament, which turn out to be blueprints for tremendous expansion.

A first step would be to stop the teaching of flag-waving history and substitute real history. I was taught in school that the U.S. wins all its wars because it is on the side of justice. What a dangerous lie in a nuclear age!

Children should be taught that the causes of the two World Wars included crude national and industrial rivalries, that the American Revolutionary and Civil Wars were about economic issues more than idealistic ones,

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Certain characteristics of our species are particularly dangerous and related to the launching of wars. People, singly or in groups, who feel hostile toward others, because of differences in religion or color or nationality, would feel guilty if they admitted this to themselves; so they manage to project their own hostility onto their presumed enemies.

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that our involvement in Vietnam was a power grab, that our Mexican War in 1848 was a land grab, and that the repeated armed interventions in Central America and the Caribbean were at the behest of American industrialists worried about their investments. Then when they are adults they won't be quite so easily misled by press and politicians who are engaged in saber rattling.

More basically, our schools and universities should keep reminding students of the true nature of human beings: potentially generous and potentially greedy; capable of great kindness, yet more cruelly murderous than any other creature; happy to build and happy to destroy; eager for power and, having gained some, increasingly hungry for more; honorable in interpersonal relations but cynical in taking advantage of organizations and groups; heartless as national leaders toward other nations.

Certain characteristics of our species are particularly dangerous and related to the launching of wars. People, singly or in groups, who feel hostile toward others, because of differences in religion or color or nationality,

would feel guilty if they admitted this to themselves; so they manage to project their own hostility onto their presumed enemies. They accuse them of duplicity, of barbarity and of planning aggression. They feel entitled to threaten to wipe them off the face of the earth. When their enemies react to these threats with counter threats, the original aggressors see the counter threats as proof that they were right to be hostile in the first place.

This is paranoid thinking. This is the way in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. dealt with each other from 1917 until World War II, with disparagement, insults, violent threats—each side insisting it was totally noble and that the other was totally evil. This is how the Turks and Greeks on Cyprus, the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the Israelis and the Arabs, have tried to salve their own consciences—by hating and attacking each other. Only outsiders can see how both parties in each conflict are deceiving themselves and preventing a compromise solution.

The self-serving, paranoid aspects of human thinking should be discussed by school and college students, not once, not once a year, but at every opportunity offered by courses in current events, social studies, communications and literature, history, biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, ethics.

I don't know whether a thorough familiarity with the pervasiveness of paranoid thinking will put people more on guard

against falling into it when tensions develop between nations. Maybe not. Perhaps the impulse of people in any country to close ranks and hate the supposed enemy will always take over. But it seems worthwhile to attempt to build up a resistance to it, for the alternative, sooner or later, is nuclear war.

In the early grades where animosities, aggressions and hurt feelings come to the surface easily, teachers could use every episode not simply to discern who is at fault but to show, in the real life of the class, how readily misunderstandings and misaccusations arise.

In America the extended family and the true community are rare. There are no universal values except for the importance of money and of getting ahead, neither of which brings emotional comfort.

We are a people who have always slipped easily into violence—in betraying and eliminating the Indians, in frontier justice, in abusing Blacks. We have crime rates that are many times as high as those of other comparable nations. Television violence has catered to this appetite and also heightened it. We know

now that the viewing of programs and movies of brutality makes adults and children at least a bit more cruel in their behavior afterwards, and that it lowers their ethical standards. If we are at all serious about avoiding war we must arouse people to turn against brutal shows. Additionally, we must persuade parents not to buy war toys. These attempts will take decades, at best.

We can't wait to begin the education for peace until children are in school. Their attitudes are half formed by then. Parents should take more interest than they do now in teaching children—right from infancy—to be considerate, cooperative and loving in the family.

One of the surprising impressions I've gained from traveling in other parts of the world is how much less quarreling there is among children and how much less yelling and slapping there is by parents. We have a tense, angry society. My own interpretation is that we have badly overdone our emphasis on tough competition and rugged individualism. In most other countries the individual and the nuclear family get enormous emotional support from a tightknit community which provides comfort, security and a strong web of customs and values.

In America the extended family and the true community are rare. There are no universal values except for the importance of money and of getting ahead, neither of which brings emotional comfort. Each young family is

on its own, to set its own aims and values, to find its occupations and housing, to make friends if it has the knack, to decide how its children will be raised. The price in anxiety and tension is high.

It is not the school's responsibility to change the adult society directly. But, if educators get a sense of where the problems lie, they can help to raise children who will have a better chance of solving them later.

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